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INTRODUCTION: THE STRENGTH OF STANDING ROCK  
AND THE WEAKNESS OF THE LAW 
The 2016–17 encampment at Standing Rock, North Dakota has 
put on public display the impressive strength and ongoing vitality 
of traditional Native American religions, not to mention the 
spiritual grounding and rhetorical force of their resolve to defend 
the sacred. But intensive coverage has also put on display just how 
weak the legal remedies available to Native people are as they seek 
to defend sacred lands and waters.1 In addition to the proposed 
pipeline’s endangerment of drinking water by crossing the 
Missouri River a half mile upstream from the reservation 
boundary, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe cited concerns about the 
pipeline’s desecration of a veritable sacred district of gravesites, 
stone rings designating Lakota ancestral knowledge, Sitting Bull’s 
traditional encampment, and the holy confluence of the Cannonball 
River and the Missouri. The enormous eddy that formed in Spring 
at this confluence fashioned large spherical sacred stones (hence 
Cannonball) until the Army Corps of Engineers built an enormous 
dam forming Lake Oahe. 
 
 1. For a discussion of how the Dakota Access Pipeline controversy exposes the 
weakness of treaty claims, see Carla F. Fredericks & Jesse D. Heibel, Standing Rock, the Sioux 
Treaties, and the Limits of the Supremacy Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 477 (2018). 
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The processes for tribal consultation and public consideration 
of adverse effects on cultural resources like sacred sites (and natural 
resources like water that are also cultural resources) ostensibly 
safeguarded by historical preservation and environmental law 
turned out, in this case, to be hoops to jump through, and the 
broader purposes of which can easily be exploited by pro-
development environmental consultants, corporations, and 
agencies. One need not be a specialist to sense something amiss 
when, on July 16, 2016, the Army Corps of Engineers issued its 
formal “Finding of No Significant Impact” for the crossing of the 
Missouri. This finding formally concluded the review necessary 
under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) without a fuller 
Environmental Impact Statement process that NEPA requires when 
a federal action is more consequential for the human environment.2 
Playing the few legal cards available to it under NHPA, NEPA, and 
other laws relating to federal permitting of the crossing of 
waterways,3 the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe failed to persuade a 
federal court to issue a preliminary injunction blocking approval of 
the pipeline’s crossing of the Missouri River at Lake Oahe.4 Despite 
considerable available evidence that the Army Corps’ consultation 
with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe fell short of standards set by 
Congress,5 and standard practice in the Obama Administration6 
and clarified in the courts,7 the judge found the claims insufficient 
for a preliminary injunction.8 
But the three federal agencies involved with the Dakota Access 
Pipeline approval immediately issued a halt to construction 
pending further review. And in December 2016, the Army Corps 
 
 2. National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101 et seq., especially § 306108 
(1966); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–35 (1969). 
 3. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012); Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 403 (2012). 
 4. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Standing Rock I), 205 F. 
Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 5. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a–et seq., amended by 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 470a(d), 470w(4) (1994); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012) 
(amended 1994); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000) . 
 6. See Letters from the Advisory Council for Historic Pres. to Jo-Ellen Darcy, U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs (May 19, 2016, Aug. 19, 2016). 
 7. See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 8. Standing Rock I, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4. 
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denied the remaining easement for the Missouri River crossing 
until alternatives were considered under an Environmental Impact 
Statement process, an action which drew the pipeline company’s 
lawsuit challenging the decision. When President Trump took the 
reins of power, he issued a directive on day two of his 
administration for the Army Corps to grant the necessary easement 
and to expedite completion of the Dakota Access Pipeline. A range 
of challenges to Trump’s directive in courts have extended the legal 
process through the time of this writing and will extend into the 
future. Whatever the final outcome, the Standing Rock/Dakota 
Access story begs a question: Why—and how—should Native 
peoples boldly perform prayer, ceremony, and encampment itself 
as protest, with the world watching and admiring their spiritual 
resolve, and not have any meaningful recourse under religious 
freedom law? Why, in other words, are we even talking about the 
legal weeds of environmental and historic preservation law and not 
about what many consider the American first freedom? 
The answer to the why of the question is the starting point for 
this Article, but I will make quick work of it: Native American 
claims to sacred lands have consistently failed in the courts, either 
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or under its 
statutory counterpart, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(1993).9 Indeed, Standing Rock’s downstream neighbor, the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, failed to block the Dakota Access 
Pipeline’s completion with a religious freedom claim that was too 
little and too late to effect a preliminary injunction, since the district 
court judge found the religious freedom claims were nullified by a 
laches determination, and in any event unlikely to succeed on the 
merits, given the difficulty of establishing a substantial burden on 
religious exercise in sacred land case law.10 
My answer to the how entails a more complex consideration of 
the distinctive contours of Native American religions as they relate, 
 
 9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012) 
[hereinafter RFRA]. On the First Amendment, see Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 
U.S. 439 (1988); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 
1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
On RFRA, see Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 
U.S. 1281 (2009). 
 10. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Standing Rock II), 239 F. 
Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017). For fuller treatment, see infra note 287. 
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or not, to the legal conceptualization of religion. The distinctiveness 
of Native religions has mattered not simply insofar as they are land-
based, a point that has been made often, and well. More 
elementally, I will argue, what distinguishes Native religions and 
such legal claims to traditional religions like those of the Standing 
Rock Lakota/Dakota is that they are collective in shape. 
Like so many begged questions, the one raised at Standing 
Rock is also a rhetorical one, and I will argue in this Article for 
an approach to the collective rights of Native American 
religious claims. 
Because religious liberty protections have so often failed in the 
courts to deliver meaningful protections to distinctive Native 
American religious traditions, Native communities and their 
advocates have looked beyond the First Amendment and religious 
freedom law to accommodations under either federal Indian law, 
or under federal Indian law in concert with other legal regimes, 
such as historic preservation, environmental law, or Native specific 
statutes like the Native American Grave Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).11 “Religion” has often been seen as a 
category too closely associated with the process of colonization and 
dispossession to meaningfully, much less legally, encompass the 
full reach or get at the thick weave of indigenous practices, beliefs, 
lifeways, and land relationships that are shot through with the 
religious without being solely, or plainly, religious. “We don’t have 
a religion; we have a way of life,” is a maxim often heard in Indian 
country. What is more, the growing momentum of legal discourses 
of tribal sovereignty, on the one hand, and of the rights of 
indigenous peoples in international law, on the other, have folded 
rights to “religion” into broader political and cultural rights to 
peoplehood. This is all to the good. 
But a reluctance to speak of Native traditions in the language of 
religion has produced its own difficulties. The preferred everyday 
parlance of Native “spirituality” over “religion,” or the legal 
parlance of “cultural resource” or “traditional cultural property” 
over “sacred site,” can and does come at considerable expense to 
the protection of sacred places, practices, objects, and remains. For 
 
 11. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
13 (2012). 
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“religion,” notwithstanding its indeterminacy, remains a powerful 
category word by virtue of its place in the U.S. Constitution and in 
discourses of American national identity. Native advocates have 
long understood a doubleness of religious freedom discourse: its 
power to exclude them from, say, sacred land protection together 
with the generative power of an appeal to religious freedom in 
getting accommodations and even legislation like NAGPRA 
through legislatures despite being fewer than two percent of 
the population.12 
In what follows, I argue that religious rights protections for 
Native American places, practices, objects, and ancestral remains, 
can be understood more properly as collective rights of Native 
communities rather than as the private conscience rights of so many 
Native individuals. What I propose is an approach to Native 
American religious claims that aligns and conjoins such claims with 
elements of federal Indian law and with the emerging norms of 
indigenous rights in international human rights law. Oriented by 
theoretical insights from my field of religious studies, my argument 
draws on a critical reading of recent discussions in religious 
freedom law about group rights, but especially on federal Indian 
law’s elaboration of the special government-to-government 
relationship with Native American communities as collectivities, 
and what courts have identified as collective rights to religion 
under accommodations in the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection 
Act.13 If religious freedom arguments are read in light of these 
multiple sources of authority, rather than merely as making 
reference to religious freedom law, they may not be the non-starters 
that the signal decisions on Native American religious freedom 
made by the Supreme Court suggest to be the case.14 In this regard, 
 
 12. From the time that followers of the Peyote Way incorporated as the Native 
American Church and Pueblo leaders appealed to religious freedom to preserve ceremonial 
feast dances in the 1920s, Native leaders have understood both the value and costs of 
articulating their practices and beliefs in the category of religion. See, e.g., THOMAS 
CONSTANTINE MAROUKIS, THE PEYOTE ROAD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE NATIVE 
AMERICAN CHURCH (2010); TISA WENGER, WE HAVE A RELIGION: THE 1920S PUEBLO INDIAN 
DANCE CONTROVERSY AND AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2009). 
 13. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668d (2012) 
(amended 1962). 
 14. See RFRA §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Lyng, 485 U.S. 
439; Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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I aim to suggest the promise of more intellectual commerce 
between the disparate fields of federal Indian law and religious 
freedom law.15 
I am emboldened to make this argument, on the one hand, by 
my training in academic religious studies, a field whose critical turn 
has made it more keenly aware of the constructed, contested, and 
malleable nature of the category of religion, and by extension, the 
discourse of religious freedom. Religious studies scholars have also 
unearthed how that discourse has historically privileged the rights 
of some religious people over others, particularly along the lines of 
the individual right in contrast to the collective tradition. And, to 
be sure, scholarship on Native American religious traditions in 
particular takes pains to point out the often irreducibly collective 
nature of Native American religious claims. As the Lakota scholar 
Vine Deloria, Jr. famously wrote, “there is no salvation in tribal 
religions apart from the continuance of the tribe itself.”16 
If what counts as religion is not given but arrived at through 
processes of deliberation and constellations of power that make 
some voices more authoritative than others, one time-honored axis 
along which this deliberation has aligned is the question of 
whether, as Durkheim famously argued, the sacred is an eminently 
social thing17 or whether, following Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, or 
William James, it is elementally a matter of subjective experience.18 
 
 15. There has been surprisingly little intellectual commerce between the field of 
federal Indian law and that of religious freedom law. This is curious because key decisions 
shaping First Amendment Free Exercise interpretation in recent memory, especially Smith 
but also Roy and Lyng that led up to Smith, concern Native American religions—a 
correspondence that often goes unnoticed. It is curious also because much of the case law 
that has given shape to federal Indian law has concerned a profound indigenous regard for 
place, peoplehood, and lifeways, the urgency of which is as much spiritual or religious as it 
is economic or political. 
 16. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 196 (2007). As legal 
scholar Alex Tallchief Skibine puts it, the importance of sacred sites “is less about individual 
spiritual development and more about the continuing existence of Indians as a tribal people.” 
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred 
Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 273 (2012). 
 17. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Carol Cosman 
trans., 2008) (1912). 
 18. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 
(Willard R. Trask trans., Harcourt Inc. 1959) (1957); RUDOLF OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY: 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NON-RATIONAL FACTOR IN THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE AND ITS RELATION 
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If the latter cluster of viewpoints has generally carried the day in 
American legal interpretations of religion’s definition, there is 
anything but a consensus among religious studies scholars that 
religion is, at base, a matter of private conscience or subjective 
experience—indeed there may just be consensus that it is, at base, 
a social phenomenon. 
On the other hand, I am emboldened to make this argument by 
the confluence of four distinct legal developments. First, the 
Supreme Court’s 2014 holding in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
that for-profit corporations are considered persons with protectable 
religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), makes clear that the legal reach of religious freedom is 
hardly constrained by the conventional wisdom that America’s first 
freedom is keyed in the liberal vein to an individual’s conscience 
alone.19 Given the highly charged political climate of Hobby Lobby’s 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act, this may seem like an outlier 
or splitting of hairs, but the decision does suggest a development 
in a long history of religious freedom decisions that have cautiously 
engaged the rights of religious groups as groups. Indeed, a close 
reading of Wisconsin v. Yoder,20 and a number of other cases, 
suggests that the Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby is no such outlier, 
and this can help frame a rethinking of what courts have done to 
flatten collective Native American claims in Lyng v. Northwest 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n21 and the Ninth Circuit’s 2008 ruling in 
Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service.22 
Second, legislative and administrative accommodations for 
Native American religions based on treaty relationships and the 
legal doctrine of federal trust responsibility, even those that extend 
to preserve and protect the religions, cultures, and languages of 
 
TO THE RATIONAL (John W. Harvey trans., 1958) (1917); WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE (1985). 
 19. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see RFRA, §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4. 
 20. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 21. Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 22. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 
U.S. 1281 (2009). This is, to be sure, not entirely intuitive. Indeed, courts have begun to apply 
other elements of Hobby Lobby to Native American religious freedom claims in a manner that 
does not lean toward this particular outcome. See, e.g., Oklevueha Native American Church 
of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016). See infra note 277. 
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recognized Native communities, are based on the structure of 
nation-to-nation regard for the political status of tribes. An inquiry 
into the case law concerning a Native American religious 
accommodation to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act 
suggests how effectual this view has been for religious rights of 
tribes.23 In the Eagle Act accommodation cases, courts have 
recognized the priority of protections resting on this distinctive 
basis over the religious freedom rights of individuals, including 
Native American individuals. 
Third, even if First Amendment and RFRA jurisprudence has 
largely confirmed the individual rights basis of religious freedom 
in findings against tribal claims, in a number of arenas, courts have 
made increasingly consistent use of a distinction between 
individual claims and what we might identify as the hybrid claims 
of collectives. 
Fourth, there have been important developments in clarifying 
indigenous rights within international human rights law. The 2007 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
affirmed with reservations by the United States in 2010, clarifies 
how recognized international human rights protections, including 
religious rights, must be regarded in terms of collective, and not 
simply individual, rights, if they are to extend equally and justly to 
indigenous peoples and people.24 
A. Structure of Argument 
The structure of the Article roughly follows this sequence in the 
argument. The first Part considers a consistent judicial 
misrecognition of Native American religious freedom claims to 
sacred lands heretofore as those merely of individual practitioners, 
through a consideration of major First Amendment cases and those 
weighing the corresponding statutory protections of the RFRA. 
This Part also examines contemporary discussions of an 
institutional turn in religious freedom law to help suggest that the 
judicial misrecognition is not inevitable in religious freedom law. 
The second Part considers the shape of legislative 
accommodations specific to Native American communities under 
 
 23. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668(d) (2012). 
 24. G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 
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statutes like the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 
NAGPRA, and a number of administrative accommodations. In 
this Part, I argue that these statutes and regulations are properly 
understood as clarifications that religious accommodations for 
Native communities will conform more to the collective contours 
of federal Indian law than to the individual conscience contours of 
religious freedom law. 
The third Part considers how courts have recognized the often 
collective shape to Native claims under such Native specific 
legislative and administrative religious accommodations, 
especially those under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. 
The fourth Part considers how a more consistent approach to 
Native American religious freedom in the register of collective 
rights conforms to emerging norms of international law spelled out 
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.25 
The fifth and final Part concludes that an elaboration of the 
group rights of Native American religious freedom can draw 
support from the Supreme Court’s 2014 recognition, in Hobby 
Lobby, that religious liberty rights can pertain to certain kinds 
of collectivities. 
I owe a particular debt here to the work of Kristen Carpenter, 
who argues that, in American Indian religious freedom cases, 
courts worried about potential “slippery slopes” of concern in other 
minority religious freedom cases consistently overlook the internal 
“limiting principles” of indigenous religions that accompany 
virtually any claims that Native communities qua communities 
make, thus exaggerating the potentially unlimited nature of 
individual claims.26 Carpenter views as a welcome development 
legislative and administrative accommodations in the wake of 
failed religious freedom claims in the courts, but she observes 
that such accommodations are always balanced against a range 
of other, often very powerful, non-Indian stakeholder interests.27 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in American 
Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387 (2012) [hereinafter Carpenter, Limiting 
Principles]; Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 
118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009); see also Skibine, supra note 16. 
 27. Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 26, at 436–76. 
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With a general preference for the nation-to-nation and 
consultative model over that of the legislative-administrative 
accommodations model, together with a strong argument for the 
cultural property rights of tribes to sacred places, Carpenter 
implies, but does not expressly argue, that Native claims under the 
broader religious freedom protections of the First Amendment, 
RFRA, and RLUIPA, can and ought to be viewed in light of their 
collective nature. 
In these pages, I wish to build on and extend Carpenter’s work, 
to argue that Native religious freedom claims can gain further 
traction under the protections of the First Amendment, RFRA, and 
RLUIPA if those claims are construed as not merely individuals 
asserting rights of conscience but as collective rights. Of course, 
prevailing political theory in the liberal tradition, and not 
surprisingly most First Amendment jurisprudence, regards 
religious freedom, like the right to free speech, expression, and 
even assembly, as a right of individual citizens. But as a number of 
religious liberty scholars have argued, there are some compelling 
ways to think of the religious liberty of groups.28 
B. Timeliness of Argument in Light of Hobby Lobby 
My argument draws sustenance as well from the Supreme 
Court’s 2014 ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., recognizing the 
religious freedom rights of a closely held for-profit corporation in 
its challenge to the contraceptive coverage mandate of the 
Affordable Care Act.29 Importantly, the Court recognized the 
religious freedom of the corporation itself, a form of collective right 
expressly distinguished from the religious freedom rights of its 
aggregate members.30 The Supreme Court’s approach to RFRA in 
Hobby Lobby as a bold extension beyond the Court’s jurisprudence 
under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, together with 
its finding that closely held corporations have religious freedom 
rights, are departures that very well could carry some significant 
implications for courts’ future reckoning with religious freedom 
claims by Native American communities, not simply as 
 
 28. See infra note 80. 
 29. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 30. Id. 
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aggregations of individuals or as analogues to religious 
congregations, but as forms of collective organization. 
Although the Hobby Lobby majority insisted otherwise, it was a 
holding of what Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, called “startling 
breadth” in terms of its recognition of RFRA’s expansive reach.31 
That breadth, that departure, is seen keenly when juxtaposed to a 
weighty appellate court decision that RFRA did not protect the 
claims of six American Indian nations to a sacred mountain, despite 
a district court holding in a different circuit that did find a RFRA 
protection for sacred lands.32 
In Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service (The San Francisco 
Peaks Case), 2008, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, overrode its 
three-judge-panel decision to affirm federal approval of a scheme 
to spray treated sewage effluent from the City of Flagstaff as 
artificial snow to enhance recreational skiing on Arizona’s San 
Francisco Peaks, despite the claims by the Navajo, Hopi, and four 
other tribes that in thus desecrating their holy mountain, the Forest 
Service would violate their religious freedom rights under RFRA.33 
The Ninth Circuit majority indicated its holding did not question 
the sincerity of the asserted religious convictions or the ill effects of 
the sewage-to-snowmaking scheme that native practitioners would 
“feel,” but in a decision that had plenty to say about the nature of 
religion, the Ninth Circuit distinguished diminished “spiritual 
fulfillment” from a “substantial burden” on “religious exercise” 
under RFRA. 
To settle the proper interpretation of “substantial burden” 
under the statute, the legal question at issue in the case, the Ninth 
Circuit turned to the Supreme Court’s 1988 holding in Lyng v. 
Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass’n, which found no First 
Amendment violation of the religious freedom of three California 
tribes when the U.S. Forest Service approved a logging road 
through a sacred precinct necessary for cosmic renewal 
ceremonies.34 The High Court in Lyng took pains to acknowledge 
 
 31. Id. at 739 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 32. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 
U.S. 1281 (2009); Comanche Nation v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Okla. 2008). 
 33. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058. 
 34. Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
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both the sincerity of the tribal claims and to acknowledge the road 
would surely cause “spiritual disquiet,” but found no prohibition 
of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment because the 
government action had not coerced practitioners to depart from 
their religion.35 
Although the facts aligned—tribal sacred land claims on public 
lands—the Ninth Circuit dissent in the San Francisco Peaks Case took 
issue with whether Lyng should be controlling for an interpretation 
of RFRA, given Congress’s concerns in enacting RFRA in the first 
place. Be that as it may, I take the two cases as a starting point for 
this analysis because both decisions involve tribes as litigants and 
accept the factual findings about the sincerity and shape of the 
collective religious obligations and ceremonial duties on those 
sacred places. But in their conclusions, both cases flatten those 
collective claims on the one hand, into claims about spirituality of 
individual practitioners, and on the other project those specific 
claims into a potential slippery slope of idiosyncratic challenges by 
individuals claiming Native American religion as the basis for any 
number of claims. Despite a more expansive interpretation of 
Congress’s intent in RFRA on the matter in question in the Tenth 
Circuit,36 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the San Francisco 
Peaks Case, and Native efforts to protect access and integrity of 
sacred places on public lands have since struggled to gain traction 
in U.S. courts.37 
In Hobby Lobby, however, the Supreme Court did offer a 
considerably more expansive interpretation of RFRA. There, the 
Court held that Congress, in RFRA, intended to include closely held 
for-profit corporations in its definition of “persons” capable of 
protected “religious exercise.”38 In Hobby Lobby, the Court found 
that the protected religious exercise in question was that of the 
closely held private corporation, one with over 13,000 employees, 
and not simply the individual members of the Green family who 
operate the corporation in a manner consistent with their 
evangelical Christian beliefs.  
 
 35. Id. at 452. 
 36. Comanche Nation, 393 F. Supp.2d 1196. 
 37. See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Standing Rock 
II), 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 38. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014). 
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Although the two sacred lands cases and Hobby Lobby’s 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act present issues that are hardly 
identical, the contrast in the Court’s findings about the relevance of 
RFRA is striking. This goes to the heart of a double standard—not 
simply an intellectual difficulty with the distinctive contours of 
Native American religions but a consistent and thorough 
misrecognition of Native claims to protect sacred places, practices, 
objects, ancestral remains, and other elements of cultural heritage. 
I. JUDICIAL MISRECOGNITION OF NATIVE AMERICAN  
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAIMS 
As the dissenting opinions in both Lyng and the San Francisco 
Peaks Case make plain, courts have clearly not fully understood the 
distinctive facets of Native American religions, especially religious 
relationships to land. It is not easy to shoehorn the distinctive traits 
of Native American traditions of sacred land, peoplehood, and 
ways of life into the category of religion as it has been 
conventionally understood in the West and conceptually bounded 
in the discourses of the law. Native religions are many, not one, 
often with widely divergent beliefs even in one community. They 
are decidedly oral. They are oriented toward sacred lands in ways 
that defy most Christian analogies. They are integrated with other, 
less visibly religious, aspects of lifeways where the “sacred” is not 
clearly set apart from “profane” matters of economic livelihood or 
political organization. Religious beliefs and practices are often 
markedly local, rather than generally universal propositions 
disaggregated from everyday life on a particular landscape—no 
one tries to convert you to the Lakota religion, for example. Native 
religious freedom claims have typically involved forcibly 
-interrupted traditions, and efforts to renew those traditions 
have often prompted challenges to their “authenticity.” Indeed, 
there is considerable legal literature that takes note of these 
distinctive contours.39 
 
 39. See, e.g., LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS: CULTURE, RELIGION, AND LAW 
IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES (2002); HUSTON SMITH, A SEAT AT 
THE TABLE: HUSTON SMITH IN CONVERSATION WITH NATIVE AMERICANS ON RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (Phil Cousineau ed., 2006); Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: 
Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REV. 145 (1996); 
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I contend, however, that these intellectual difficulties are not 
driving the contrast between judicial interpretation of RFRA in the 
San Francisco Peaks Case and in Hobby Lobby. The driving issue, I 
believe, is a reluctance to reckon more fully with the collective 
nature of most Native religious freedom claims. Even Judge 
Fletcher’s dissent in the San Francisco Peaks Case and Justice 
Brennan’s in Lyng, for all their spirited chastening of the 
fundamental misunderstanding of the workings of Native 
American religious claims to sacred lands, fail to address the 
collective nature of the claimants themselves. Tribes, not individual 
practitioners, and collective obligations, not individual piety, form 
the basis of the claims. 
A. First Amendment 
The two key Supreme Court decisions on Native religious 
practice have been flagship cases by which the Rehnquist Court 
contained the reach, generally, of the First Amendment’s free 
exercise protection. In its 1988 decision in Lyng v. Northwest 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, the High Court upheld Forest Service 
approval of a logging road through California high country 
considered to be a sacred precinct to several Native nations.40 
The Supreme Court granted the sincerity of Yurok, Karok, and 
Tolowa beliefs about the high country, but reasoned that no 
religious exercise was unconstitutionally burdened by the 
government action.41 
The Supreme Court built on Lyng in the 1990 case Employment 
Division v. Smith, where it found no First Amendment violation in 
the denial of unemployment benefits to two chemical dependency 
counselors fired for their involvement in the Native American 
Church.42  This was despite broad recognition in the courts of the 
Peyote Way as a bona fide religion and, in the case of the 
respondents in Smith, as a keystone of their own sobriety.43 
 
Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural Conflict 
over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757 (2001). 
 40. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439. 
 41. Id. at 449–50. 
 42. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 43. Id. 
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Although a century of efforts in legislatures and courts had secured 
a solid recognition of the Native American Church as a disciplined 
moral tradition that involved sacramental ingestion of peyote, the 
Court transformed forty thousand devout practitioners of the 
Peyote Way into felons overnight.44 The Smith decision is known 
for nullifying First Amendment challenges to “neutral laws of 
general applicability,” even when a government action has the 
effect of prohibiting religious exercise.45 Lyng and Smith not only 
settled the particular questions at hand; they also foreclosed 
countless other Native American cases that might have come before 
courts. Native communities were not alone in their concern with 
the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith. First 
Amendment and religious organizations spanning the entire 
culture-wars spectrum came together and pressed Congress for a 
response to Smith, which they attained in the 1993 Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). However, the broad coalition 
that pressed for RFRA decidedly left the Native peyotist practices 
specifically at issue in Smith out of the statutory rejoinder to the 
decision, no doubt concerned that trying to right the particular 
wrong about the Peyote Way would jeopardize the coalition. As 
discussed below, Peyote Way practitioners secured their own 
statutory protections one year later, and the difference between 
RFRA and that result, an amendment to the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), is crucial to my purposes.46 
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
In RFRA, Congress expressly sought to restore what the 
Supreme Court in Smith had taken away: the application of judicial 
strict scrutiny to government actions, including neutral, generally 
applicable ones, that substantially burden religious exercise. The 
return to Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to Smith restores 
judicial interpretation of compelling state interest as “only those 
interests of the highest order.”47 
 
 44. See MAROUKIS, supra note 12. 
 45. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901. 
 46. See infra note 140. 
 47. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
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The Supreme Court returned the volley four years later, finding 
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states.48 This prompted a 
number of state legislatures to enact their own RFRA statutes, and 
Congress itself passed the more narrowly tailored Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000. Among 
other things, RLUIPA included an amendment to RFRA’s 
definition of “religious exercise,” more expansively including “any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief.”49 The Supreme Court affirmed RFRA’s 
constitutionality with respect to federal laws in Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006), suggesting RFRA held 
considerable promise for Native American religious challenges to 
the many federal actions regulating their lives.50 
But even with the leg up offered by RFRA and the even more 
expansive definition of religious exercise included in RLUIPA, 
Native claims to sacred land protection under RFRA have generally 
failed because they have been largely foreclosed by the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in the San Francisco Peaks Case. There, the Ninth 
Circuit found that federal approval of an Arizona ski resort’s plan 
to spray artificial snow made with treated sewage effluent did not 
“substantially burden” the religious exercise of the Navajo, Hopi, 
and other tribes who regard the San Francisco Peaks as a sacred 
mountain.51 The Ninth Circuit accepted ninety-odd detailed factual 
findings about the complex religious practices and beliefs 
associated with the San Francisco Peaks massif. Some of those 
beliefs, like Navajo concerns about contamination from water that 
had been in contact with the dead discharged from mortuaries and 
hospitals, were impervious to assurances of the purity of the water 
 
 48. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 49. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc 
-5 (2018). 
 50. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 51. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir., 2008), cert. denied, 556 
U.S. 1281 (2009). An alternative finding by a lower court within the Tenth Circuit appealed 
to that circuit’s RFRA precedent and expressly rejected the government’s request to invoke 
the Ninth Circuit interpretation of substantial burden in Navajo Nation. It found a RFRA 
substantial burden because the development of a building at Fort Sill would obstruct a 
traditional view of Medicine Bluffs, a sacred site to the Comanche, and would significantly 
inhibit the “spiritual experience” of tribal members. Comanche Nation v. United States, 393 F. 
Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D, Okla. 2008). Still, as of this writing, no appellate court has risen to 
challenge the Ninth Circuit’s view in Navajo Nation that tribes have no viable RFRA claims 
for threatened sacred sites. 
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measured in terms of parts per million. But the en banc majority 
determined that religious exercise was not “substantially 
burdened” under a narrow interpretation of what Congress meant 
by substantial burden in its passage of RFRA. The Ninth Circuit 
rejected a broader construal urged by the tribes in the case and 
engaged by the Tenth Circuit, and viewed “substantial burden” as 
a term of art referencing the Supreme Court’s pre-Smith First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit majority 
applied the Court’s interpretation of “burden” from the Lyng 
decision—which of course involved claims under the First 
Amendment, not under RFRA—but which was found to be a 
controlling pre-Smith decision. This view prevailed over the 
argument that Lyng, cited centrally in Smith just two years later, 
was tantamount to the Smith jurisprudence that RFRA was clearly 
enacted to address. Instead of finding that religious exercise was 
substantially burdened, the Ninth Circuit found that merely the 
possibilities for “spiritual fulfillment” were “diminished.”52 
One could rightly argue that the transmutation of religious 
exercise into spiritual fulfillment is precisely what is likely to 
happen when complex land-based and intrinsically collective 
Native American traditions are assimilated conceptually within a 
discourse of religious freedom that naturalizes and universalizes 
Protestant Christian traditions of the interior, subjective and 
unmediated relationship between the faithful individual and God. 
If this is true, then the San Francisco Peaks Case, especially given the 
Supreme Court’s consideration and rejection of a petition for 
appeal, is perhaps a final nail in the coffin. As Judge Fletcher wrote 
in the Ninth Circuit’s original three-judge-panel ruling for the 
tribes, effectively drawing a line in the sand: 
The Court in Lyng denied the Free Exercise claim in part because 
it could not see a stopping place. If Appellants do not have a valid 
RFRA claim in this case, we are unable to see how any Native 
American plaintiff can ever have a successful RFRA claim based 
on beliefs and practices tied to land that they hold sacred.53 
 
 52. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F. 3d at 1063. 
 53. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d in 
part en banc., 535 F. 3d. 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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C. “Native Spirituality” and the Subversion of Religious Freedom  
in Lyng and Navajo Nation 
Other scholars have provided extensive analyses of the Lyng 
decision from a variety of important critical perspectives,54 and 
elsewhere I provide a more detailed analysis of the workings of the 
discourse of spirituality in the San Francisco Peaks Case.55 Here, I will 
only observe that while the First Amendment claims in Lyng and 
the RFRA claims in the San Francisco Peaks Case were those of tribes 
to sacred lands with attendant collective religious duties and 
obligations, the Supreme Court in Lyng and the Ninth Circuit in 
the San Francisco Peaks Case flattened those collective claims into 
those of so many individuals exercising a kind of 
protean “spirituality.” 
The provenance of this judicial analysis harks back to the Lyng 
majority’s turn to a controlling, if only loosely related, 1986 
Supreme Court decision. In Bowen v. Roy, the High Court found that 
a government requirement of a Social Security number for access to 
social services did not violate the religious freedom of an individual 
who claimed, as a matter of Native American religious belief, that 
having such a number would harm the spirit of his child.56 While 
Lyng, like Roy, involved Native American religious claims, the 
analogical alignment that the Lyng majority saw in the two cases is 
dubious. Roy involved the claims of an individual, one with few 
connections to Native communities or teachings established by 
Native communities; Lyng involved tribal governments 
connecting religiously necessary collective obligations to a 
specific sacred place. 
The courts took pains not to dispute the sincerity of the 
religious claims involved, but the Lyng and Navajo Nation courts 
viewed those claims as matters of subjective feeling, and the effect 
of the government actions as only matters of “diminished spiritual 
 
 54. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: 
Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (2005); Skibine, supra note 16; 
Vogel, supra note 39. 
 55. Michael D. McNally, From Substantial Burden on Religion to Diminished Spiritual 
Fulfillment: The San Francisco Peaks Case and the Misunderstanding of Native American Religion, 
30 J.L. & RELIGION 36 (2015). 
 56. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
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fulfillment.” Even the spirited dissent by Justice Brennan in Lyng57 
and the lengthy, elaborately substantiated dissent by Judge Fletcher 
in Navajo Nation, for all their concern that the majorities had entirely 
misunderstood the nature and reach of Native American religions, 
did not challenge the underlying definitional assumption that 
religion is, in essence, a subjective matter.58 Citing William James’s 
definition of religion as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of 
individual men [and women] in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may 
consider the divine,” Judge Fletcher asserts “[r]eligious exercise 
sometimes involves physical things, but the physical or scientific 
character of these things is secondary to their spiritual and religious 
meaning. The centerpiece of religious belief and exercise is the 
‘subjective’ and the ‘spiritual.’”59 Fletcher’s view surely pertains to 
many contemporary religious phenomena, but, as I discuss below, 
religious studies scholars would hardly content themselves with 
such a view of an essence or even a thus configured “centerpiece” 
of religion. 
More insidious still in these two cases is the slippage from the 
language of religion to a language of spirituality, and specifically 
nature spirituality, which is ineluctably subjective in mode, protean 
in texture, and in the case of claims to “sacred lands,” oriented 
toward “nature” in general rather than involving highly specific 
duties, obligations, and regulations with regard to highly specific 
places. Title I of the Navajo Nation’s own legal code codifies respect 
toward San Francisco Peaks and the other holy mountains that 
define Navajo land.60 But the Ninth Circuit majority could only see 
 
 57. Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the majority had fundamentally 
misunderstood the idioms of Native religions. He doubted that the Native people would 
“derive any solace from the knowledge that although the practice of their religion will 
become ‘more difficult’ as a result of the Government’s actions, they remain free to maintain 
their religious beliefs.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 477 
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). “Given today’s ruling,” Justice Brennan continued, “that 
freedom amounts to nothing more than the right to believe that their religion will be 
destroyed.” Id. 
 58. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 470–71, 474–77 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Navajo Nation v. U.S. 
Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1096 (9th Cir., 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009). 
 59. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d at 1096 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) 
(citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31–32 (1929)). 
 60. Navajo Nation Code Ann. tit. 1, § 205 (B)–(D) (2010). 
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the accepted factual findings before it as constituting a nebulous 
mountain piety, one that had arguably been facilitated, in terms of 
access, by the ski resort’s improvements.61 To inform its contention 
that Native claims to “spiritual fulfillment” would have no 
stopping place, the Ninth Circuit majority noted that the Coconino 
National Forest in question involves “approximately a dozen” 
mountains sacred to various tribes, as well as other landscapes 
“such as canyons and canyon systems, rivers and river drainages, 
lakes, discrete mesas and buttes, rock formations, shrines, 
gathering areas, pilgrimage routes, and prehistoric sites.”62 The 
district court’s factual findings in the case included a finding that 
the White Mountain Apaches, one of the plaintiff tribes, had made 
snow at Sunrise, a ski area they operate on a mountain on their 
reservation, with water from a lake that includes discharged treated 
wastewater.63 The district court judge hastened to observe that one 
witness testified that Apaches held the entire White Mountain 
reservation to be sacred, and also that the ski area was one of the 
two major ski areas in Arizona and potentially in competition 
with the Snowbowl on San Francisco Peaks.64 Thus conflating all 
mountains and all landscapes as sacred to the White Mountain 
Apaches, and blending all the complicated distinctions in belief 
and practice made by a sophisticated religious tradition into a 
single claim of Native spirituality that all nature is sacred, and 
hinting that some claims could be opportunistic or disingenuous, 
the district court could impugn the full reach of the burden on 
religion by the San Francisco Peaks Case.65 
In a telling, footnoted exchange with the dissent on the question 
of the subjective nature of religion, the Ninth Circuit 
majority wrote:  
For all of the rich complexity that describes the profound 
integration of man and mountain into one, the burden of the 
recycled wastewater can only be expressed by the Plaintiffs as 
damaged spiritual feelings. Under Supreme Court precedent, 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d at 1066 n.7. 
 63.  Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 897–98 (D. Ariz. 2006). 
 64. Id. at 898. 
 65. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d at 1066. 
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government action that diminishes subjective spiritual fulfillment 
does not ‘substantially burden’ religion.66 
In the case of Lyng, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion 
expressed a related concern about a slippery slope: if the Court 
recognized any one First Amendment claim to a sacred site by 
peoples deemed to regard everything as sacred, where would the 
subsequent claims end? “However much we might wish that it 
were otherwise,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “government simply 
could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s 
religious needs and desires.”67 “Spiritual fulfillment” as a species 
of religious exercise can be hindered without violating the 
Constitution, a potentiality that cannot serviceably define the 
realm of religious freedom protection because it implies no 
stopping place. 
D. Religion as a Collective Category: Religious Studies Theory  
and First Amendment Law 
A second development that emboldens the argument that 
Native religious claims should be considered assertions of 
collective rights is the recent critical turn in my own field, religious 
studies, and the lens this critical turn offers for interpreting some 
moments in formative judicial decisions on First Amendment 
religious freedom claims. For while the prevailing view of the First 
Amendment sees its religious rights as consisting chiefly of the 
inviolability of individual conscience as a tenet of liberal political 
philosophy, it does not comport with the best of religious studies 
thinking. Neither is it an unambiguous view of the First 
Amendment religion clauses, as a range of religious freedom 
scholars have increasingly argued in recent decades. I turn now to 
some core debates within the study of religion which, by their very 
presence, should make quick work of the intellectual surety of the 
often-implicit judicial pronouncements on the nature of religion. 
Although scholars of religion for at least a century have not 
been able to agree on precisely what religion is, one thing most 
contemporary scholars of religion agree upon is that one cannot 
take as given what religion is. Especially in the last fifty years, the 
 
 66. Id. at 1070 n.12. 
 67. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988). 
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field of religious studies has organized itself as a conversation 
around the constructed nature of the category of religion. The 
eminent University of Chicago scholar, Jonathan Z. Smith, put the 
matter this way: 
[W]hile there is a staggering amount of data, of phenomena, of 
human experiences and expressions that might be characterized 
in one culture or another, by one criterion or another, as 
religious—there is no data for religion. Religion is solely the 
creation of the scholar’s study. It is created for the scholar’s 
analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison 
and generalization.68 
But the critical turn has extended beyond merely disclosing the 
making of “religion” as a category and raised awareness of how 
that making has served ongoing European and American projects 
of colonization and imperialism abroad and Protestant hegemony 
at home.69 Scholars whose reference points for the negotiation of 
religious difference extend beyond the modern West to Islamic 
societies remind us of how culturally specific the liberal secularism 
touted as universal is and how many other discursive alternatives 
to “religious freedom” have addressed questions of religious 
diversity within a common polity.70 
Religious studies scholars have in recent decades turned critical 
attention to the historical emergence of the category of “religion” 
and its corollary, “religions.” Arguing not only that there is no 
“given” category of religion, much less a settled definition of such 
a given category, a position made some time ago by Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, these scholars describe the “production” of the 
category and its uses in the dense social, economic, and political 
contexts of the West’s colonialization and empire.71 Emerging from 
 
 68. JONATHAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN at xi 
(1982) (emphasis omitted). 
 69. See, e.g., TOMOKO MASUZAWA, THE INVENTION OF WORLD RELIGIONS: OR, HOW 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSALISM WAS PRESERVED IN THE LANGUAGE OF PLURALISM (2005); RUSSELL 
T. MCCUTCHEON, MANUFACTURING RELIGION: THE DISCOURSE ON SUI GENERIS RELIGION AND 
THE POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA (1997); ROBERT A. ORSI, BETWEEN HEAVEN AND EARTH: THE 
RELIGIOUS WORLDS PEOPLE MAKE AND THE SCHOLARS WHO STUDY THEM (2005). 
 70. See TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER 
IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (2009); SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL 
AND THE FEMINIST SUBJECT (2005). 
 71. WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION (1963). 
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Protestant theology and encounters with “world religions,” earlier 
generations of religious studies scholars regarded differences 
between traditions as the distinctive phenomena of a universal pan-
human category of religion; the process of defining “religion” was 
part of a project of differentiating “good,” universal, spiritual, 
tolerant religion from bad, sectarian, material, tribal, or 
nationalistic commitments. 
There has been a long-standing tension in theory of religion 
between those stressing religion’s elementally social or collective 
character, notably in the tradition of French sociologist Emile 
Durkheim or in the German critical tradition of Karl Marx, and 
those stressing its grounding in the subjective experience of the 
individual. Such theoretical insights took deeper root in Europe in 
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries than they did in the 
United States, which boasted a relative flourishing of voluntary 
religion, propelled by powerful religious experience. But as 
scholars in religious studies have amply shown, the shape of 
American religion—and no less the definitional shape that religion 
took in American courts—was also part of a process of 
secularization, one which privileged the religious exercise of some, 
namely Protestants, over that of others, especially 
Roman Catholics.72 
Although courts were not a principal arena for the  
management of religious diversity in the United States until the 
1940s, American religious historians observe that the discourse of 
religious freedom privileging individual, private belief over 
corporate practice was well honed in nineteenth century efforts to 
restrict the reach of Roman Catholic institutions, especially 
parochial schools.73 Ironically, the discourse of religious freedom 
was that which authorized discrimination against the religious 
freedom of Catholics, since the Roman Catholic Church was 
deemed, despite considerable internal disagreement on the issue, 
 
 72. WILLIAM R. HUTCHISON, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN AMERICA: THE CONTENTIOUS 
HISTORY OF A FOUNDING IDEAL (2004). 
 73. See FINBARR CURTIS, THE PRODUCTION OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2016); 
TRACY FESSENDEN, CULTURE AND REDEMPTION: RELIGION, THE SECULAR, AND AMERICAN 
LITERATURE (2007); DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2011); TISA 
WENGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL (2017). 
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to be monolithically against religious freedom and global in reach. 
For example, in a series of deeply anti-Catholic “Blaine 
Amendments” to state constitutions, governments were forbidden 
from any funding of parochial schools.74 
Indeed for scholars who, like Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, are 
deeply informed by this scholarship, there is no lack of skepticism 
that religious liberty, because of the particular instability of the 
category of religion, can be a meaningful discourse for the 
protection of freedoms for religious practitioners.75 Indeterminacies 
aside, much of the recent scholarship at the juncture of religious 
studies, culture, and law has been so focused on the power 
inequities maintained by the discourse of religious freedom to have 
seemingly moved well beyond religious freedom as a 
viable strategy.76 
But it is precisely this religious studies insight into the discourse 
of religious freedom—the exclusions encoded into its presumed 
universalism, and the exclusions felt sharply in Lyng, and Smith”—
that emboldens me to think about how that discourse can be trained 
in new directions. For discourses don’t just function as airtight 
expressions of colonizers’ wishes; they involve contradictions, 
trade-offs, and in the end, consent, to continue to work. And as 
discourses go, that of religious freedom will not be disappearing 
anytime soon. Because it is ensconced in the first clauses of the Bill 
of Rights, “religion” will long be a term of power. For the student 
of religion, the category is never given, never natural; its meaning 
has shifted with time, and by extension, is plastic enough to 
countenance new possibilities. 
 
 74. See Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, School Choice: The  
Blaine Amendments & Anti-Catholicism (June 1, 2007), http://www2.law.umaryland.edu 
/marshall/usccr/documents/cr182b7620072.pdf; Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment 
Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 38 (1992). 
 75. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Religion Naturalized: The New Establishment, in AFTER 
PLURALISM, 94–95 (Courtney Bender & Pamela Klassen eds., 2010); see also WINNIFRED 
FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2007); WINNIFRED FALLERS 
SULLIVAN, PRISON RELIGION: FAITH-BASED REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION, (2011). 
 76. ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, BEYOND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE NEW GLOBAL 
POLITICS OF RELIGION (2013); POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et 
al. eds., 2015); ANNA SU, EXPORTING FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND AMERICAN 
POWER (2016). 
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E. Church Autonomy 
Even beyond Native religious claims, there are moments in the 
mainstream of religious freedom jurisprudence where the courts 
have defined religion in ways that suggest not only the social fact 
but perhaps the legal force of religion’s elementally collective 
nature. Although the liberal political philosophy undergirding the 
civil liberties in the Bill of Rights seems plain enough at first glance, 
the dissenting traditions of the radical reformation that informed 
the founders’ approach to religion were decidedly communal. 
There is considerable contemporary debate among religious 
freedom scholars whether the First Amendment religion clause 
extends to protect the autonomy or religious freedom of churches 
and religious institutions, and if so, whether those protections 
pertain to the institution itself or are derivative of the rights of 
individual members.77 And the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby 
decision has amplified this debate in the context of RFRA.78 
In the 1980s, there was a period of considerable scholarly 
exchange on this question. Douglas Laycock identified a thread of 
First Amendment protection for what he called “church 
autonomy,” drawing on a tradition of judicial deference in church 
property disputes.79 Courts came to settle those cases by generally 
deferring questions of orthodoxy to the denominational juridical 
structures themselves.80 In the 1980s, cases developing an 
interpretation of the “ministerial exception” to anti-discrimination 
 
 77. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case 
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981); 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 99 
WIS. L. REV. 99 (1989). For the problematic nature of trying to stabilize religious claims by 
deference to religious institutions, see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Why Distinguish Religion, 
Legally Speaking?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1121 (2014). 
 78. See THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah Schwartzman et al. 
eds., 2016). 
 79. Laycock, supra note 77; see also, Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, 
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 85–86 (1998); Frederick Schauer, 
Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005). 
 80. This same reasoning would later inform some judicial regard that what 
congregations or dioceses did with their property was itself protectable religious free 
exercise, and this view was codified in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized  
Persons Act of 2000, which clarified that what collective religious entities chose to do with 
their worship spaces was properly to be understood as religious exercise. 42 U.S.C.  
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 
005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  10:16 AM 
205 Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right 
 231 
statutes raised the question of where individual rights to religious 
free exercise end and where the rights of religious organizations 
begin. In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, the Supreme Court 
had upheld the First-Amendment-rights logic of religious 
exemptions from the reach of anti-discrimination laws in particular 
situations.81 In Amos, a custodian at a Mormon facility was 
dismissed for failing to receive a “temple recommend,” a formal 
church commendation of conduct, and the Court held that the 
religious exemption from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.82 In an article concerned with a 
liberal secularist bias against the rights of religious groups to self-
definition, Frederick Gedicks argued that such cases “should be 
resolved by deferring to the group, even at the cost of infringing 
upon important individual and government anti-discrimination 
interests.”83 Gedicks’s recognition that group rights extends 
beyond a social contract notion that groups’ rights are inferred from 
the rights of individuals was not meant to be illiberal. 
“[C]onstitutional recognition of a strong right of religious group 
autonomy in making membership decisions,” he argued, “is 
necessary to preserve religious pluralism and the individual 
autonomy that is at the heart of liberalism.”84 
The discussion of church autonomy was renewed in the wake 
of Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC, a 2012 Supreme Court ruling where a 
“ministerial exception” to employment provisions of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act was found to protect a Lutheran 
school from the claims of a dismissed teacher, even though the 
nature of her work was not primarily religious because she was a 
“called teacher,” as opposed to a “lay teacher,” and because the 
church claimed they trained her as a minister and considered her 
one.85 Extrapolating from what the majority opinion considered a 
 
 81. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Gedicks, supra note 77, at 105. 
 84. Id. at 105–06. 
 85. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC (Hosanna-Tabor), 
565 U.S. 171 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990). 
See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013); Thomas C. Berg et al., 
Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 175 (2011); Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions, 
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long history of government deference going back to the Magna 
Carta, the Court deferred in the case to a religious institution’s own 
definitions for what constitutes a “minister” for the religious 
purposes it alone defines.86 
Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzmann took issue with a 
developing “religious institutionalism” in First Amendment 
thought. “Institutions do not, in themselves, give rise to any 
distinctive set of rights, autonomy, or sovereignty,” they argued. 
“[W]hat might be called institutional or church autonomy is 
ultimately derived from individual rights of conscience.”87 
Others welcomed Hosanna Tabor as “a clear case for the 
Church.”88 For Richard Horwitz, the decision signaled an 
“institutional turn” that need not rely on the unique rights of 
religious institutions but nonetheless asserts that religious 
institutions perform a “distinctive function.” Religious “institutions 
are a constitutionally significant element of our infrastructure of 
public discourse,” Horwitz writes, “not as God-given or ‘natural,’ 
but simply as important and well established . . . . These 
institutions developed alongside, and in some cases preexisted, the 
liberal state itself, and have long been coordinate parts of our 
broader social structure. The state—and its limits—formed with 
these institutions in mind. No mysticism is required to suggest that 
this might be constitutionally relevant.”89 
As will be discussed below, Hobby Lobby introduces a Supreme 
Court holding that closely held private corporations have rights to 
the free exercise of religion that are distinct from the individual 
religious liberty rights of individual owners. But before we depart 
 
21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 201, 206 (2013); Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: 
(Towards) An Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013); Paul 
Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L REV. 1049 (2013); Michael W. 
McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012). 
 86. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171, 182–83 (2012). 
 87. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. 
L. REV. 917, 920 (2013). For some scholars, Hosanna-Tabor produced the right result, but less 
on the grounds of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment than on the Assembly and 
other clauses. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the 
Instrumental Value of Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73 (2014); John D. Inazu, The Four 
Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787 (2014); John D. Inazu, The 
Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 335 (2013). 
 88. Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 839, 840 (2012). 
 89. Horwitz, supra note 85, at 1052. 
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from a discussion of the question of group rights to religious 
freedom under the First Amendment, we should attend to the 1972 
Supreme Court decision that perhaps makes the most apt case for 
a more expansive view of Native American religious freedom as a 
group right. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, widely 
acknowledged as the high-water mark of Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence, presented sufficient ambiguity to generate an 
important exchange about whether the First Amendment protected 
the rights of groups to religious liberty. The details of the case offer 
some sound analogies for collective rights of Native American 
religious freedom. Yoder was an Amish father who, along with two 
other families, was prosecuted for refusing to enroll children in 
public schools after eighth grade, per Wisconsin’s compulsory 
education law.90 The families took the issue to the courts, claiming 
that Wisconsin’s law violated their free exercise of religion, and 
ultimately prevailed in a nearly unanimous decision. The Court 
applied a Sherbert analysis, first, determining that the Old Order 
Amish religion had been burdened by the generally applicable law 
and, secondly, weighing whether Wisconsin had made a sufficient 
showing of its “compelling government interest” in thus burdening 
Yoder’s free exercise right. Most religious liberty commentators 
gravitate toward the decision’s now quite remarkable 
pronouncement that religious freedom might in some cases 
outweigh compulsory education: “only those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”91 
But the extensive balancing analysis undertaken to get there is 
suggestive for thinking about the group rights of Native American 
religious traditions. To be sure, the Court was specifically holding 
unconstitutional the criminalization of the non-complying parents 
under the Wisconsin compulsory education law; it was their 
individual religious exercise rights at stake. Still, the analysis 
turned on the broadly communal, and broadly religious, nature of 
the Amish traditional way of life and the threat that compulsory 
 
 90. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 91. Id. at 215. “We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State’s 
interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or 
subordination of all other interests.” Id. 
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public education would have for the passing on of that Amish way 
of life. Perhaps this is rooted in a sentimental regard for the 
countercultural quaintness of the Amish, but, in any case, the Court 
held that First Amendment protections extended to the entire 
Amish way of life, having ascertained that this way of life was 
“inseparable and interdependent” with Amish religion and 
distinguished from merely “subjective” rejection of social values 
that are merely “philosophical and personal”: 
The traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of 
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared 
by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living. . . . 
This command is fundamental to the Amish faith. Moreover, for 
the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic 
belief. . . . [R]eligion pervades and determines virtually their 
entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet 
through the strictly enforced rules of the church community.92 
Ira Lupu has argued that “individuals, not institutions, are 
always the ultimate source of religious conviction,” and cases such 
as Yoder recognize the aggregated interests of individuals and not 
the interests of the Amish in general.93 Still, the Court’s analysis 
turns on interpreting the claims of the Yoder parents in terms of the 
intergenerational passing on of a religious way of life going 
back centuries.94 
While Professor Lupu has understood that any apparent 
“group” rights in Yoder were purely associational and derivative of 
individual rights, Ronald Garet has interpreted Yoder in terms of its 
recognition of Amish “groupness” or “communality.”95 Garet reads 
 
 92. Id. at 216. 
 93. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of 
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 422 (1987). 
 94.  Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a 
long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the 
Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious 
beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that 
belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish 
communities and their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the 
State’s enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. 
 95. Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1001 (1983). 
 
005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  10:16 AM 
205 Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right 
 235 
Yoder together with one of the key Supreme Court cases affirming 
Native American tribal sovereignty, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
to argue that Courts have and can further extend a jurisprudence 
that promotes “communality” or “groupness” as among the key 
social goods.96 
F. Group Rights to Native American Religious Freedom 
 as a Hybrid Bundle of Rights 
A further consideration in a discussion of group rights inspired 
by Yoder is whether a consideration of Yoder, or any other Free 
Exercise Clause ruling involving neutral laws of general 
applicability, should matter in light of the Smith decision.97 But the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith did not overturn Yoder; it merely 
distinguished the case as not controlling for Smith. 98 Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion in Smith took pains to distinguish Smith from 
Yoder, since the Wisconsin compulsory education law in question 
was, like the Oregon controlled substance statute, a neutral law of 
general applicability.99 Scalia reasoned that in Yoder, it was not 
religious freedom alone that tipped the scales, but religious 
freedom claims bundled together with other rights—parental 
rights in the case of Yoder—and Scalia saw no such bundle of rights 
present in the Smith case.100 
Alison Dussias argues that Native American religious freedom 
claims, at least those by federally recognized tribes or by members 
of those tribes, are indeed to be construed as hybrid matters of 
bundled rights of the sort Justice Scalia speaks about in the 
Smith ruling: 
In the case of Indian religious practices, one can argue that other 
rights, in addition to speech and association rights, are also at 
stake, such as the right of tribes to have their sovereignty 
respected, as well as rights flowing from the trust relationship 
between tribes and the United States. . . . Because the federal-
tribal relationship also has a constitutional basis, tribal religious 
rights claims can be understood as hybrid rights claims. Indeed, 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
 98. Id.  at 881–82. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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the Government cited its obligations pursuant to tribal rights as 
secular purposes underlying management plans at Rainbow 
Bridge National Monument and other public lands. 
Consequently, under the Smith hybrid rights doctrine, 
government actions that burden Indian religious exercise 
arguably are subject to compelling interest scrutiny even post-
Smith, without need for consideration of RFRA, on the theory that 
they burden hybrid rights.101 
I underscore Carpenter’s point here. Indeed, whether or not 
courts will find their way to recognizing the typically collective 
nature of Native American claims to religious freedom, there ought 
to be judicial recognition that even a Native American individual’s 
religious freedom rights are meaningfully bundled together in the 
federal government’s special nation-to-nation relationship with 
recognized tribes. 
II. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS  
FOR COLLECTIVE NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGION 
In this Part, I turn from judicial consideration of religious 
freedom law to statutory and administrative accommodations 
specific to Native American cultures and religions, protections that 
are specifically rooted not in the universal rights of religious 
freedom—though they appeal to that logic in substantive ways 
— but in the distinctive political status under federal Indian law of 
Native American communities, at least those receiving federal 
acknowledgement as American Indian tribes or Alaskan 
Native communities. 
A. Legislative Accommodations 
Although Native leaders and their advocates drew on the 
discourse of religion and religious freedom to gain congressional 
passage in 1978 of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
(AIRFA), the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
Act (NAGPRA) of 1990, and AIRFA’s Peyote Amendments of 1994, 
and although courts in certain high-profile cases interpreted those 
statutes as religious freedom laws, these protections decidedly 
 
 101. Allison M. Dussias, Friend, Foe, Frenemy: The United States and American Indian 
Religious Freedom, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 347, 417–18 (2012). 
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relied for their logic on the distinctive political status of federally 
recognized Native American tribes and their members, and thus 
instances of collective rights.  This stands in contrast with the view 
that such laws as AIRFA are primarily clarifications of religious 
freedom law, applying those protections to individuals in their 
capacity as religious practitioners of Native religions.102 
Even when certain courts came to interpret AIRFA or NAGPRA 
more in terms of the logic of religious freedom and thus delimited 
the reach of the respective statutes, the executive branch affirmed a 
number of procedural protections, notably President Clinton’s 
Executive Order 13007 on American Indian Sacred Sites103 and 
Executive Order 13175 on Consultation and Coordination with 
Indian Tribal Governments,104 and regulatory changes in 1994 to 
protections under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation 
Act.105 These administrative actions may reference the importance 
of protecting sacred sites, or “religion,” together with formal 
reversals of former federal policy criminalizing the practice of 
Native American religions, but they, too, turn on logic of the 
distinctive political status of federally recognized Indian tribes, 
tribal self-determination, and the government-to-government 
relationship between the United States and the tribes. 
B. The Federal Trust Responsibility and Cultural/Religious Rights 
The American Indian Movement and an American 
counterculture embracing “Indianness” did much to transform the 
political climate in which Native claims could be asserted by the 
 
 102. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996; Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13. (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(c)(3). 
Congress did not define Indian Tribe in AIRFA narrowly to include only those Native 
nations with formal federal recognition and specified as its consulting class “native 
traditional religious leaders[,]” not the governments of recognized tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 1996(2). 
Still, the 1994 Peyote Amendments to AIRFA did, for the purposes of those specific 
amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(c)(3). 
 103.  Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1996 app. at 690–91 (2012). 
 104. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).  This Executive Order 
was affirmed in President Obama’s Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 2009 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 887 (Nov. 5, 2009). 
 105. Regulations were amended in 2004 under Section 106 of the National Historic 
Preservation Act. See 36 C.F.R. 800(c)(2)(ii) (2019). 
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1970s; so too did the legal context. Under President Nixon, the 
United States formally adopted a policy of Indian self-
determination and a series of court decisions firmed up a legal basis 
for that policy, elaborating on two principles, treaty and trust that 
went deep into the legal past.106 The specific nation-to-nation 
obligations spelled out in hundreds of different treaties, with what 
the courts recognized as “domestic dependent nations,” were 
interpreted to create a special federal trust responsibility with those 
tribes as a guardian to a ward.107 Although it is not surprising that 
such a paternalistic approach has provided a source of federal 
power, including a source of power to intervene in tribal affairs to 
protect the rights of individual tribal members,108 it has also served 
as a source of tribal rights, especially when courts have held the 
United States accountable to the “highest fiduciary standards” in 
its trustee role.109 
And while the federal trust responsibility applies in fairly plain 
legal fashion to management of natural and economic resources, it 
has also been understood to extend to cultural resources, including 
languages and religions of tribes.110 Rooted in treaties, the trust 
relationship also distinguishes the federal government’s 
relationship with federally recognized tribes from its treatment of 
other minority populations, including, vexingly, Native 
communities not formally recognized by the United States. 
There have been equal protection, due process, voting rights, 
and other civil rights challenges to this approach to federal Indian 
law and policy. In a series of cases in the 1970s, even as it was ruling 
otherwise in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,111 the 
Supreme Court made clear, in Morton v. Mancari (1974), that it was 
the political, rather than racial, character of American Indian status 
that had animated federal Indian law and justified the Bureau of 
 
 106. President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 
564 (July 8, 1970); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 93–638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n (2012)). 
 107. Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).  For application to 
Native religions, see United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128–29 (2002). 
 108. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942). 
 109. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 
(D.D.C. 1972). 
 110. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 176. 
 111. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 
005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  10:16 AM 
205 Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right 
 239 
Indian Affairs’s hiring preference for Indians.112 In a cluster of 
related rulings in 1977,113 1978,114and 1979,115 the Supreme Court 
suggested that laws that “might otherwise be constitutionally 
offensive” might be acceptable if they are enacted pursuant to the 
United States’ trust relationship.116 To underscore the non-racial 
basis of its reasoning, the Court in Morton v. Mancari made explicit 
that the focus on members of federally recognized tribes, rather 
than on American Indians generally, suggested the political and 
non-racial basis for the unique relationship.117 The approach has 
broadly safeguarded other Indian laws supporting tribal self-
determination, such as the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act, which recognized the tribes as 
contractors, akin to states and local governments, for federal 
programs; and the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, passed in the 
same year as AIRFA, that privileged adoption and foster placement 
of Native children within tribes.118 
The context of these other legal developments in the 1970s is 
crucial to understanding how AIRFA, NAGPRA, and the AIRFA 
Peyote Amendments of 1994 appear not simply as conventional 
 
 112. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, 
rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are 
governed by the BIA in a unique fashion. . . . Here, the preference is reasonably 
and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal. This is the principal 
characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial 
discrimination. 
Id. at 554. 
 113. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
  The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal legislation with 
respect to Indian tribes, although extending to Indians as such, is not based upon 
impermissible racial classifications. Quite the contrary, classifications expressly 
singling out Indian tribes as subjects of legislation are expressly provided for in 
the Constitution and supported by the ensuing history of the Federal 
Government’s relations with Indians. 
Id. at 645. 
 114. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 115. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation 
(Yakima Indian Nation), 439 U.S. 463 (1979). 
 116. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (2002) (quoting Yakima Indian 
Nation, 429 U.S. at 501). 
 117. The Morton Court noted that because the preference applied “only to members of 
‘federally recognized’ tribes,” the preference could be seen to not be directed toward a racial 
group. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. 
 118. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 
–450n. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2012). 
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religious freedom protections for individuals, but as protections for 
a particular species of religious exercise by tribes as collectives.  In 
this regard, the statutes remain wedded to the notion that Native 
Americans possess a special political and legal status that 
distinguishes many Native protections from the civil liberties 
applying to all American citizens. 
C. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) 
Amid other efforts to support tribal self-determination in 
Washington, formal congressional endorsement of religious and 
cultural rights was clearly not a priority for all tribal leaders, 
concerned as tribal leaders were at the time with addressing abject 
poverty and related social ills plaguing reservation communities. 
Furthermore, the conceptualization of federal Indian law has 
tended to partition off religious and cultural rights from other 
aspects of tribal sovereignty. But for Suzan Harjo and others in the 
coalition that worked to craft and secure passage of AIRFA, 
religious and cultural freedoms were “atmospheric” of other 
dimensions of tribal self-determination and sovereignty advanced 
in the fields of economic development, education, and 
jurisdiction.119 As Harjo put it: “This is part of the big stuff, and it’s 
foundational, it’s fundamental, it’s atmospheric, it’s contextual to 
everything else. If the traditional Indians stop being the traditional 
people and our religions and cultures and languages cease to exist, 
there are no more Native people.”120 
For this reason, Native leaders sought a broad United States 
declaration formally disclaiming the civilization regulations that, 
for fifty years, had criminalized Indian religions under assimilation 
policies, or that placed “religious infringements” “result[ing] from 
the lack of knowledge or the insensitive and inflexible enforcement 
of Federal policies and regulations premised on a variety of laws.” 
These infringements include laws “designed for such worthwhile 
purposes as conservation and preservation of natural species and 
resources but were never intended to relate to Indian religious 
 
 119. Interview with Suzan Shown Harjo, Director, Morning Star Institute (Oct. 
21, 2009). 
 120. Id. 
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practices and, therefore, were passed without consideration of their 
effect on traditional American Indian religions.”121 AIRFA’s formal 
restatement of policy reads as follows: 
 On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the 
United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their 
inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the 
traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and 
Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use 
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship 
through ceremonials and traditional rites.122 
To the policy declaration was added a process for federal 
agencies to “evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation 
with native traditional religious leaders in order to determine 
appropriate changes necessary to protect and preserve Native 
American religious cultural rights and practices,” calling for an 
executive branch report to Congress after the first year.123 
What is more, AIRFA’s congressional findings specify some of 
the distinctive contours of Native religions that have been denied 
by U.S policies: “access to sacred sites required in their religions, 
including cemeteries” and “use and possession of sacred objects 
necessary to the exercise of religious rites and ceremonies.”124 For 
these reasons, not to mention the plain language of the policy 
directive, AIRFA could be read as a statutory clarification that the 
First Amendment, if it were to effectively protect traditional Native 
religions, would fully protect “access to [sacred] sites, use and 
possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through 
ceremonials and traditional rites.”125 And, to be sure lawyers 
representing claimants in its first ten years advanced such a 
reading, AIRFA grafted a variety of Native claims to free exercise 
jurisprudence and secured for their clients clear First Amendment 
 
 121. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012)). 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012). 
 123. Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 2, 92 Stat. at 470. Significantly, the consulting class of AIRFA 
are “native traditional religious leaders” and not tribal governments. 
 124. Id. at 469. Later, by way of the 1994 amendment, Congress added a clause 
protecting peyote use specifically. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2012). 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 1996. 
 
005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  10:16 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
242 
free exercise rights to sacred lands or to sacred practices.126 
Although there were some hopeful signs elsewhere in the lower 
courts, most of these cases claiming that AIRFA clarified First 
Amendment rights wound up failing in various 
appellate courts.127 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Lyng put the final nail in the 
coffin to the fuller reading of AIRFA as a clarification of how the 
First Amendment should be applied to Native American claims. 
The Lyng Court found, “[n]owhere in the law is there so much as a 
hint of any intent to create a cause of action or any judicially 
enforceable individual rights,” and found in AIRFA’s legislative 
history a statement by its sponsor, Representative Udall, that “the 
bill would not ‘confer special religious rights on Indians,’ would 
‘not change any existing State or Federal law,’ and in fact ‘has no 
teeth in it.’”128 
D. A Finer-Grained Reading of AIRFA 
That courts found AIRFA could not hold water as a statutory 
enactment of First Amendment religious freedom protections for 
Native people led many to conclude AIRFA was a legislative 
failure, another empty promise to Native people, who were again 
tragically undermined. Consider, for example, Andrew Gulliford’s 
discussion of the “Failure of the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act” in an otherwise nuanced treatment of sacred site 
 
 126. E.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 
(8th Cir. 1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 
1159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 127. For a fuller list of litigation on the basis of AIRFA in its first decade, see Sharon 
O’Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, in HANDBOOK OF 
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 27 (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991). 
 128. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988) (quoting 
124 CONG. REC. 21,444–45 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall)). In his dissent, Justice Brennan 
agreed AIRFA “does not create any judicially enforceable rights” but added:  
[T]he absence of any private right of action in no way undermines the statute’s 
significance as an express congressional determination that federal land 
management decisions are not ‘internal’ Government ‘procedures,’ but are instead 
governmental actions that can and indeed are likely to burden Native American 
religious practices. That such decisions should be subject to constitutional 
challenge, and potential constitutional limitations, should hardly come as  
a surprise. 
Id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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management: “With the vote on AIRFA, Congress recognized 
Indian religious beliefs but made no real effort to protect those 
beliefs and practices. Legislators passed a useless law.”129 
This view is apt in part. Even as the advisory, procedural 
resolution of Congress that the Lyng Court said it was, AIRFA was 
not taken very seriously by the two Reagan administrations and, 
arguably, others, thereafter. But AIRFA has hardly been the failure 
that this common reading of it suggests. In at least four respects, 
AIRFA proved to be a remarkable legislative accomplishment, and 
one that helps understand how Native religious rights can be 
construed as collective rights. 
First, AIRFA grafted into the federal trust responsibility a 
specific concern for the religious and cultural rights of the tribes. 
This was explicit in AIRFA’s wording: U.S. policy would “protect 
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right[s].”130 
Especially given its acknowledgement that the United States had 
formerly pursued policies expressly designed to undermine Native 
religions, AIRFA’s policy redirection was no small matter. But 
AIRFA’s preamble also took pains to suggest there were a host of 
inadvertent ways that federal policies had the effect of 
undermining Native religions. Importantly, Congress did not 
define Indian tribe in AIRFA narrowly to include only those Native 
nations with formal federal recognition, and specified as its 
consulting class “native traditional religious leaders,” not the 
governments of recognized tribes.131 
Second, AIRFA mandated the thorough policy review of the 
various federal agencies and report to Congress, helping set the 
agenda for accommodations and actions that would extend its 
protections. As President Carter’s liaison with the tribes, Suzan 
Shown Harjo was tapped to guide this process, and engaged a 
 
 129. ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING TRIBAL 
TRADITIONS 101–02 (2000). A better reading of AIRFA on this score is found in BURTON, supra 
note 39. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 1996. As I discuss below, AIRFA’s extension of the federal trust 
responsibility to protect and preserve Native American religions would become even clearer 
when AIRFA was amended in 1994. 
 131. Id. The 1994 Peyote Amendments to AIRFA did define “Indian tribe,” for the 
purposes of those specific amendments, in such a way that tied the peyote provisions to 
members of federally recognized tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(c)(2) (2012). 
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parallel study and implementation project by the Native American 
Rights Fund and the American Indian Law Center which was able 
to more thoroughly survey and consult in the field with the 
religious leaders.132 From its consultation, the study identified the 
following key issues where federal policies infringed on Native 
religions: (1) “preservation of and access to sacred” sites, (2) “the 
right to religious use of peyote,” (3) “the right to recover religious 
objects,” (4) “the right to cross borders freely for religious 
purposes,” (5) “the rights of incarcerated Indians,” (6) the “right to 
religious privacy,” (7) “the rights of Indian students,” and (8) “the 
right to traditional hair styles” in schools, prisons, reformatories, 
and military service.133 Within several years of AIRFA’s passage, 
the public record included formal recognition of the range of 
religious infringements that government actions directly or 
indirectly placed on Native communities, laying the groundwork 
for the subsequent legislative and administrative accommodations 
on sacred sites, ceremonial peyote use, repatriation of human 
remains from museums and scientific collections, and return of 
ceremonial items and objects of cultural patrimony.134 
Third, AIRFA created language for subsequent administrations 
to breathe meaningful life into its provisions and to relate it to other 
review and consultation processes, such as those under 
environmental and historic preservation laws, toward more 
integrated and serious federal consideration of tribal claims. In 
1996, in the spirit of AIRFA and out of a concern to expand minimal 
readings of its provisions as they were intended to apply to federal 
agencies, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13007.135 The 
Executive Order mandated that agencies managing federal lands 
would: “(1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian 
sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid 
adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites. 
 
 132. See “We Also Have a Religion”: The American Indian Religious Freedom Act and the 
Religious Freedom Project of the Native American Rights Fund, ANNOUNCEMENTS (Native Am. 
Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Winter 1979. 
 133. Id. at 8–9. 
 134. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE: AMERICAN INDIAN 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT (1979). 
 135. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1996 app. at 690–91 (2012). 
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Where appropriate, agencies shall maintain the confidentiality of 
sacred sites.”136 
Fourth, the language of Executive Order 13007 further 
elaborated the consultation logic of AIRFA to “ensure reasonable 
notice” of “proposed actions or land management policies that may 
restrict future access to or ceremonial use of, or adversely affect the 
physical integrity of, sacred sites,” and aligned such consultation 
with a 1994 Executive memorandum, “Government-to-
Government Relations with Native American Tribal 
Governments.”137 This was not just a culture of consultation; the 
momentum gained through AIRFA’s passage carried into a 
government-wide statutory, not just regulatory, tribal consultation 
provision in the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979138 
and in an amendment to the Section 106 Review process of the 
National Historic Preservation Act (1966) providing that federal 
agencies consult with tribes where they make a religious or cultural 
claim to a significant place.139 President Clinton’s Executive Order 
on “Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal 
Governments” extends and clarifies what proper consultation with 
tribal sovereigns should look like, as a matter of policy.140 
In sum, while a plain reading of AIRFA, or one shaped by the 
courts’ interpretation, finds it lacking legal teeth for the full-fledged 
protections that religious freedom suggests in constitutional law, 
AIRFA set in motion a procedural mechanism for federal 
accommodations of religious and cultural concerns of sovereign 
tribes as collectivities. To be sure, in the absence of specific legal 
causes of action, and thus judicial review, beyond those under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, such procedural mechanisms rely 
for their effect more on the diligence of the federal agency involved, 
and under various administrations that may or may not consider 
Native rights a priority among competing goods. 
 
 136. Id. § 1(a). 
 137. Id. § 2(a) (citing Presidential Memorandum on Government-to-Government 
Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994), 
reprinted in 25 U.S.C. § 5301 app. at 488 (2012)). 
 138. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (2012). 
 139. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (2012) (“In carrying out its responsibilities under section 
470f of this title, a Federal agency shall consult with any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian 
organization that attaches religious and cultural significance to properties described in 
subparagraph (A).”). 
 140. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). 
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Still, they place considerations of Native religious and cultural 
rights on a footing quite other than that of the individual civil 
liberty basis on which religious freedom has generally been seen to 
rest. AIRFA directs the United States to consult (and ultimately to 
make agreements) with tribal governments to accommodate what 
practices, places, objects, and beliefs those nations indicate are 
urgent to them without necessarily having to make a showing that 
they are protectable facets of “religious” exercise under religious 
freedom jurisprudence. Such an approach can honor the porous 
boundaries between tribal religions and tribal cultures, economies, 
polities, land-bases, or identities. And as suggested by the 
confidentiality that characterizes those consultation processes 
—one of the issue areas of friction identified through the AIRFA 
review process between Native religions and federal agency 
policies—the tribes can relate matters to them and seek 
accommodations without violating the secrecy that often 
accompanies tribal religious beliefs, practices, and institutions or 
without exposing sacred places, practices, beliefs, or objects to 
unwelcome voyeurism on the public record.141 
E. AIRFA’s 1994 Peyote Amendment 
Importantly, if AIRFA was not to be a binding clarification that 
the First Amendment would apply to the distinctive contours of 
Native religions, the distinctive contours of AIRFA as a policy 
statement of the federal trust responsibility to the tribes proved that 
it was friendlier terrain for distinctly Native religious concerns than 
the broader religious freedom protections of RFRA. Recall that it 
was shared outrage at the Supreme Court’s stripping of the First 
Amendment’s free exercise protection in Employment Division v. 
Smith that unified a coalition of religious groups across the culture-
wars spectrum and secured near-unanimous support for RFRA.142 
But for all its references to Smith, RFRA did not expressly reinstate 
the broad rights to ceremonial peyote use won so ably by 
practitioners of the Native American Church in dozens of state 
statutes and through a broad range of court-backed protections of 
 
 141. See Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 142. See supra Section I.A. 
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Peyotism.143 In the words of James Botsford, a Wisconsin attorney 
representing members of the Native American Church at the time, 
“[w]e took the hit and were not in the huddle.”144 
Having already begun specifically to consult with leaders of the 
Native American Church as part of the policy review mandated by 
AIRFA, and desiring to make any peyote protection “Scalia-proof,” 
as James Botsford put it, the strategy was to “make it an Indian 
right, rooted in the trust relationship” and resting on the distinctive 
legal and political status of the tribes and their members, which 
would also immunize it from equal protection challenges under 
civil rights law.145 The 1994 Amendment to AIRFA, as Congress 
passed it, provided that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, 
or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional 
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a 
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited 
by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or 
discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or 
transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise 
applicable benefits under public assistance programs.146 
And its definitions section made clear that “Indians” referred to 
members of federally recognized tribes and that “Indian religion” 
meant “any religion . . . which is practiced by Indians, and . . . the 
origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional 
Indian culture or community.”147 
 
 143. See People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964). 
 144. James Botsford and Walter Echo-Hawk, Remarks at “Roundtable on Native 
American Religious Freedom,” (May 2009). For an account of the effort, see James Botsford 
and Walter Echo Hawk, The Legal Tango: The Native American Church v. the United States of 
America, in ONE NATION UNDER GOD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 123 
–55 (Huston Smith & Reuben Snake eds., 1996). 
 145. James Botsford and Walter Echo-Hawk, supra note 144. 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012). 
 147. Id. § 1996a(c). The statute’s definitions section reads in part:  
(1) the term “Indian” means a member of an Indian tribe; (2) the term “Indian 
tribe” means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group or 
community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village (as defined in, or 
established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, (43 U.S.C. 1601 
et seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services 
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians; (3) the 
term “Indian religion” means any religion— (A) which is practiced by Indians, 
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Such definitional language was not only crafted to persuade 
Congress that there would be no slippery slope to gratuitous or 
untoward peyote use. It was expressly keyed to the logic of federal 
Indian law’s recognition of the special political and legal status of 
members of tribes with rights based on the treaty and trust 
relationship. This logic could be undone, the coalition feared, by 
opening the door to those claiming only religious freedom rights to 
peyote use. And to be sure, there are any number of others claiming 
religious freedom exemptions to controlled substance laws that 
have looked to AIRFA’s “Peyote Amendment” for similar equal 
protection sustenance of their claims.148 In one such case, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the RFRA claim by members of a 
religious community of South American origin to ceremonial 
ingestion of hoasca, which like peyote was regulated under federal 
controlled substance laws.149 Lawyers from the coalition 
representing the Native American Church agreed not to interfere 
with the RFRA claim, but took pains to work against any equal 
protection claim made by O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do 
Vegetal with respect to the AIRFA peyote exemption.150 
F. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990) 
The coalition that convinced Congress to recognize religious 
freedom effectively as a facet of Indian law for Peyotist tribal 
members was successful in part because it was largely the same 
circle of advocates, lawyers, tribal spiritual and political leaders, 
and allies who had recently won congressional passage of two 
repatriation statutes: the National Museum of the American Indian 
Act (1989) (NMAI Act)151 and the better known Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).152 
 
and (B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian 
culture or community.  
Id. 
 148. See, e.g., Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th 
Cir. 2016). 
 149. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 150. James Botsford & Walter Echo-Hawk, Remarks at “Roundtable on Native 
American Religious Freedom,” Vermillion, S.D. (May 2009). 
 151. National Museum of the American Indian Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q–15 (2012). 
 152. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
13 (2012). 
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Basically, the NMAI Act legislatively made provisions for the 
repatriation of human remains and other items as part of the storied 
transfer of more than 800,000 objects in the Heye Collection from 
New York City’s then-decrepit Museum of the American Indian to 
the Smithsonian Institution, a transfer that occasioned the creation 
of the Washington Mall’s magnificent National Museum of the 
American Indian. Under the NMAI Act, the flagship national 
museums of the Smithsonian were to inventory, identify, and 
consider for return to tribes or lineal Indian descendants the tens of 
thousands of Native American human remains, and a variety of 
objects, in their collections.153 But perhaps the bigger story is what 
NMAI Act negotiations with the Smithsonian enabled: swift 
passage the following year of a remarkable NAGPRA statute 
requiring that the repatriation process extend to all federally 
funded museums and government agencies, extending the items to 
be inventoried, identified, and considered for return beyond 
human remains and burial objects to several other categories of 
“cultural items.”154 These categories, later added by amendment to 
the NMAI act, most notably include “sacred objects,” defined as 
those “needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for 
the practice of traditional Native American religions by their 
present day adherents,” and “cultural patrimony,” defined as “an 
object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance 
central to the Native American group or culture itself, rather than 
property owned by an individual Native American, and which, 
therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any 
individual.”155 NAGPRA required, under penalty, “expeditious 
return” of “culturally identified” human remains and specified 
cultural items from the collections of museums and agencies to 
lineal descendants, in those cases where a clear line of descent could 
be drawn to human remains, or to tribes and Native Hawaiian 
organizations who could show “cultural affiliation by a 
preponderance of the evidence,” which statutorily was not limited 
to scientific evidence, but could include “oral traditional” 
 
 153. 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q-15. 
 154. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13. 
 155. Id. § 3001. 
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information or expert opinion.156 To these provisions was added the 
criminalization of trafficking in the protected items and tribal 
control of any human remains and cultural items subsequently 
excavated on tribal lands or federal lands in aboriginal tribal 
territories.157 Finally, NAGPRA created a Review Committee, 
including appointees from both tribal and scientific communities, 
to resolve the many contested or competing claims sure to result.158 
I cannot here undertake the fuller treatment warranted by the 
NMAI Act and NAGPRA, and particularly the lengthy subsequent 
struggles over their regulations. I could in any case add little to two 
very fine book length treatments that treat NAGPRA not merely as 
a “legal event,” in the words of Kathleen Fine-Dare, but as a 
“cultural and political process . . . one that will be shaped for long 
years to come.”159 Greg Johnson brings theoretically-informed 
religious studies attentiveness to the making of religion in that legal 
process, though importantly he distinguishes his line of analysis 
from the presumptions of suggesting that there is in the doing a 
mere “invention of tradition.”160 With a careful review of 
NAGPRA’s legislative history, the complex claims of different 
Native Hawaiian organizations, and, in subsequent work, the 
ongoing deliberations of the NAGPRA Review Committee, 
Johnson shows how the NAGPRA process has generated a large 
body of strategically-positioned religious speech, whereby Native 
practitioners lay claim, on the one hand, to the specific obligations, 
practices, and beliefs unique to their respective collective traditions, 
and to the universally applicable human rights discourse of religion 
on the other.161 In this process, Congress and administrative bodies 
remarkably find themselves debating definitions of religiously 
charged categories like “sacred object,” “cultural patrimony,” and 
the evidentiary weight of divinatory and oral traditions. Following 
 
 156. 43 C.F.R. 10.2 (e) (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (a)(4)). 
 157. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (c). 
 158. Id. § 3006. 
 159. KATHLEEN S. FINE-DARE, GRAVE INJUSTICE: THE AMERICAN INDIAN REPATRIATION 
MOVEMENT AND NAGPRA 7 (2002). 
 160. GREG JOHNSON, SACRED CLAIMS: REPATRIATION AND LIVING TRADITION (2007). 
 161. Id.; see also Greg Johnson, Apache Revelation: Making Indigenous Religion in the Legal 
Sphere, in SECULARISM AND RELIGION MAKING 170, 170–86 (Markus Dressler & Arvind-Pal S. 
Mandair eds., 2011). 
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the lines of Johnson’s analysis, I would emphasize the manner with 
which the “religious freedom” protections of NAGPRA are 
strategically conformed to the structure of a collective right. 
G. NAGPRA in the Courts: “Religion” v. “Science” 
With its considerable reach, NAGPRA has produced no small 
amount of litigation, and court interpretations have both 
strengthened and weakened its various provisions.162 In perhaps 
the highest profile challenge to the protections of NAGPRA, 
Bonnichsen v. United States, a physical anthropologist claimed that a 
federal decision to repatriate the 9,300-year-old remains of so-called 
“Kennewick Man,” found in 1996 on federal land along the 
Columbia River, to a group of area tribes that considered him an 
ancestor according to customary determinations of kinship and 
lineage, violated the statute itself.163 In its ruling in favor of the 
scientist, the Ninth Circuit not only recognized his standing to sue 
under NAGPRA, which the U.S. had argued was only authorized 
for tribal claimants, but agreed that the oral traditional evidence 
presented by the tribes could not have been found reasonably to 
outweigh the genetic and archeological scientific evidence placing 
the remains several thousand years before the tribes in question 
had arrived in the region. Specifically, the court held that for the 
purposes of NAGPRA and by using the statute’s own definitions, 
the remains are not “Native American.”164 Still, the Bonnichsen 
decision took pains to show how the federal decision to repatriate 
the remains to the tribes had gone too far in valorizing the 
evidentiary weight of oral tradition, particularly as “the record as a 
whole does not show where historical fact ends and mythic tale 
begins,” over scientific evidence suggesting no “group identity” 
between the remains and the tribes in question.165 So if there are 
elements of the NAGPRA process, such as definitional discussions 
of what counts as a “sacred object” or appeals to visionary 
 
 162. See United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1999); Pueblo of San Ildefonso 
v. Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553 
(D.N.M. 1996). 
 163. Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 367 F.3d 864 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
 164. Id. at 972. 
 165. Id. at 979; see also Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1143–44 
(D. Or. 2002) (District Court holding). 
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experience as evidence of affiliation in repatriation proceedings, 
which suggest its texture as a religious freedom statute, judicial 
interpretations, too, have stressed NAGPRA’s religious leanings. 
H. NAGPRA: A Finer-Grained Reading 
But as with AIRFA, a closer reading of NAGPRA requires us 
not only to distinguish, as Greg Johnson has, between “strategic” 
appeals to the universality of religious freedom, and also to the 
culture-specific funerary and ceremonial traditions of burial, but 
also to see how the combination of those two religious discourses 
have been grafted legally onto the discourse of collective tribal 
rights under federal Indian law. Just as AIRFA’s Peyote 
Amendment was, after the wizening process of AIRFA’s narrow 
reading by the courts and the RFRA coalition’s exclusion, 
strategically positioned not as an amendment to RFRA, where the 
logic of religious freedom would place it, but as an amendment to 
AIRFA, where the logic of federal Indian law would keep it 
immune from the condemning logic of the Smith decision,166 
NAGPRA took its place as a cultural/religious facet of a broader 
agenda promoting tribal sovereignty. 
First, NAGPRA on its face is hard to view primarily as a 
religious freedom statute. Native proponents have regarded it as  a 
basic human rights law for its fundamental acknowledgement of 
the humanity of deceased Native American persons, regarded 
hitherto as archeological resources in the Antiquities Act of 1906167 
and even the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.168 
Second, in the typical taxonomy of legal studies, NAGPRA is 
regarded as a cultural property law, not a religious freedom law, 
one which ultimately rests on the questionability of title that 
federally funded museums or agencies could ever have, under 
common law, to human remains, or under the terms of contract and 
property law, to items of cultural patrimony. Indeed, the ability to 
go to courts on the basis of these property claims, even without the 
repatriation statutes, arguably brought the parties to the table to 
shape the legislation in the first place. 
 
 166. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–90 (1990). 
 167. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33 (1906). 
 168. Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–mm. 
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Third, the procedural approach to federally recognized Indian 
tribes and Hawaiian organizations aligns NAGPRA and NMAI 
with the federal trust responsibility to preserve and protect the 
cultures, religions, and traditions of tribes, and with the 
consultative framework becoming a government-to-government 
relationship. Thus, grounded in this trust responsibility, the 
statute’s privileging of arguably “religious” tribal claims and the 
regulatory apparatus’s determinations about “sacred objects” and 
their disposition, can proceed without plainly violating the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause. This logic and the case law 
that develops it will be the subject of Part III. 
Through AIRFA, NAGPRA, and other measures considered in 
this Part, Congress and federal agencies have meaningfully 
extended the trust responsibility beyond the merely economic and 
natural resources of the tribes to the realm of cultural resources.  
These cultural resources include the traditional religions of Native 
communities with whom the U.S. acknowledges a nation-to-nation 
relationship. Clearly there are problematic elements of this 
structure, notably the controversial process for federal 
acknowledgement and the often ambiguous legal status of 
federally non-recognized tribes, a group that includes tribes like 
those treaty signatories recognized by the Commonwealth of 
Virginia and enjoying some measure of distinctive political status 
as a result, but which remain unacknowledged by the U.S., and thus 
outside the ambit of the protections discussed in this Part. But a 
closer look at these statutes shows how the legislative and executive 
branches have articulated a logic for recognizing Native cultural 
and religious rights that is collective in nature: religious in texture, 
but the legal shape of which conforms to the special political status 
of the group. In the next Part, I turn to judicial affirmation of this 
logic and this structure in case law. 
III. JUDICIAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL 
NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXERCISE 
In this Part, I turn from legislative and administrative 
accommodations of Native religious practices and beliefs that draw 
upon the discourse of religious freedom but that structurally tie 
those accommodations to the collective rights of Native nations and 
their members, to judicial recognition of this structure of Native 
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religious rights as collective, not merely individual, matters. 
Courts have articulated this distinction with some consistency as 
they have rejected a wide range of challenges, including 
religious freedom challenges, to legislative and administrative 
religious accommodations within eagle protection. This Part will 
consider those in depth, along with several other notable cases 
where courts have found their way to identifying the distinctly 
collective shape of certain Native American religious claims. 
A. Eagle Act Accommodations 
Although eagles have been protected under the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act, Congress in 1940 
expressly passed the Bald Eagle Protection Act to criminalize the 
hunting, trafficking, bartering, and possession of eagle parts, even 
a single feather, making it punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 and 
up to one year in prison.169 The act was amended in 1962 to the Bald 
and Golden Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Act) to include golden 
eagles because the two species are largely indistinguishable when 
immature.170 More importantly, the amended act enabled the 
Secretary of the Interior to establish regulations for exceptions “for 
the religious purposes of Indian tribes.”171 Subsequently, the 
National Eagle Repository was established as a catchment and 
distributor for found eagle carcasses together with a permit 
application process in which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, on 
a first-come, first-served basis, scrutinizes whether the applicant is 
an Indian who is authorized to participate in “bona fide tribal 
religious ceremonies.”172 According to the regulations, permitted 
 
 169. Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (current version at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 668 (2012)); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012); Endangered Species Act, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012). 
 170. Protection of Bald and Golden Eagles Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668(d) (2012) amended 
by Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1346. 
 171. Id. § 668(a). 
 172. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2017). In weighing permit applications, the government 
considers “( 1) The direct or indirect effect which issuing such permit would be likely to have 
upon the wild populations of bald or golden eagles; and (2) Whether the applicant is an 
Indian who is authorized to participate in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies.” Id. The 
process limits one pending application per applicant at one time and requires the following 
information on the application form: 
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eagle parts are not transferable except as those “from generation to 
generation or from one Indian to another in accordance with tribal 
or religious customs[.]”173 Wait times and restrictions have caused 
significant problems for applicants who may wait from six to nine 
months for loose feathers and two to four years for 
eagle carcasses.174 
Not surprisingly, because eagle feathers, claws, wings, and 
other parts are of clear ritual and religious significance to so many 
Native religious traditions, the permit process to operationalize this 
accommodation has brought numerous legal challenges.175 Some 
have argued that the permit process violated their treaty rights.176 
Others have challenged various aspects of the permitting process 
as a violation of their religious freedom under the First Amendment 
or RFRA.177 For the purposes of this Article, I focus on cases where 
 
(1) Species and number of eagles or feathers proposed to be taken, or acquired by 
gift or inheritance. 
(2) State and local area where the taking is proposed to be done, or from whom 
acquired. 
(3) Name of tribe with which applicant is associated. 
(4) Name of tribal religious ceremony(ies) for which required. 
(5) You must attach a certification of enrollment in an Indian tribe that is federally 
recognized under the Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of 1994 . . . . 
Id. 
 173. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(b)(1) (2017). 
 174. Exceptions to the first-come, first-served basis are made where death ceremonies 
or other emergencies are claimed by applicants. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 
1123 n.12 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 175. See, e.g., Tina S. Boradiansky, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of Federally 
Protected Wildlife, NAT. RESOURCES J. 709 (1990); Michael Davidson, United States v. Friday and 
the Future of Native American Religious Challenges to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 86 
DENV. U.L. REV. 1133 (2009); Antonia M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: 
Environmental Protection v. Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
771 (1995). Fewer studies have paid attention to the concerns of this section. See Carpenter, 
supra note 26; Matthew Perkins, The Federal Indian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle 
Protection Act: Could Application of the Doctrine Alter the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs? 30 ENVTL. L. 
701 (2000). For an excellent article see Kathryn E. Kovacs, Eagles, Indian Tribes, and the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 53 (2013). 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. 
Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986); United States v. Thirty Eight (38) Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 
649 F. Supp. 269 (D. Nev. 1986).  
 177. See, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
repository timetable causes eagle carcasses to become religiously impure); United States v. 
Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing whether the permit system’s procedural 
awkwardness violated religious freedom); United States v. Gonzalez, 957 F. Supp. 1225 
(D.N.M. 1997) (discussing whether permit application requirement to disclose proposed 
ceremonial use violates religious secrecy). 
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a variety of religious freedom challenges under RFRA have been 
asserted by practitioners of Native American religions who, by 
virtue of their identity, are excluded from the accommodation 
regime, which is restricted to members of federally recognized 
tribes. In these cases, a range of circuit courts can be said to have, 
after scrupulous consideration of competing religious clams, 
consistently acknowledged the collective nature of the Native 
American religious rights accommodated under the Eagle Act. The 
question of religion in these cases becomes a question not of the 
sincerity or particularities of the religious practice or whether or not 
the religious exercise is burdened, but a question of balancing the 
state’s compelling interest in the Eagle Act’s religious 
accommodation, to safeguard the collective religious rights of 
federally recognized tribes and their members under the federal 
trust responsibility, with the asserted rights to individual religious 
exercise advanced by litigants, including Native American 
religious practitioners. 
Courts in these cases have agreed that the United States actually 
has two compelling interests in play, and a charge to strike an 
optimal equipoise between those potentially competing interests. 
The first, obviously, is protecting wild populations of eagles. This 
was confirmed to remain a compelling interest even given the 
return of bald eagle populations since passage of the Act. As one 
court put it, “the bald eagle would remain our national symbol 
whether there were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles.”178 The second is 
the government’s compelling interest of “preserving Native 
American culture and religion,” which courts have said springs 
from established federal Indian law’s two streams of treaty and 
trust: the specific nation-to-nation obligations, spelled out in over 
370 different treaties, to quasi sovereign, domestic, dependent 
nations, on the one hand, and a federal trust relationship with those 
tribes, on the other, as a guardian to a ward.179 
Challenges have included those of Native claimants who were 
not enrolled members of recognized tribes and thus ineligible for 
the accommodation. In Gibson v. Babbitt, a Florida District Court 
 
 178. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1128. 
 179. Id. at 1128–29. The Hardman court cites Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 
F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992) and Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th 
Cir. 1991). 
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judge reluctantly rejected the claim to eagle feathers by Harvey 
“Fire Bird” Gibson, a decorated veteran and sincere native religious 
practitioner who was a lineal descendant of Native people removed 
in the Trail of Tears, but who was not a member of a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe.180 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 
concluding that the permit restriction to members of recognized 
tribes was the least restrictive means to furthering the 
government’s compelling interest: “by providing bald and golden 
eagle parts to federally recognized Indian tribes, the United 
States . . . is fulfilling a pre-existing treaty obligation to 
the tribes.”181 
Three years later, in U.S. v. Antoine, the Ninth Circuit followed 
the same line of reasoning in rejecting a religious freedom challenge 
to the Eagle Act brought by a member of a Canadian First Nation, 
even though his tribe enjoyed specific treaty rights straddling the 
border between the United States and Canada.182 Leonard Antoine 
served a two-year prison sentence for bringing eagle feathers 
without a permit into the United States for a potlatch ceremony.183 
A member of the Cowichan Band of Salish in Canada, Antoine was 
ineligible for a permit as he was not a member of an Indian tribe 
recognized by the United States.184 The Ninth Circuit concluded 
Antoine “was excluded, not because of his faith, but because he was 
not a member of a recognized Indian tribe.”185 
While noting the paternalism implied in this approach, we 
should observe how the Antoine court recognized a federal trust 
obligation to preserve and protect the religions and cultures of 
federally recognized tribes that is compelling enough to justify a 
burden on the practice of those same religions when such claims 
are made by individuals whose practice is not conjoined 
structurally by their membership in a recognized tribe. 
The exclusions based on enrollment and federal recognition 
ought appropriately to trouble those concerned with the religious 
freedom of all Native American tribes, not just the five hundred 
 
 180. Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
 181. Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Gibson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1360). 
 182. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 183. Id. at 919–20. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 924; see also United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 522 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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some who have formal legal stature as “federally recognized 
tribes.” Still, I want to call attention to the way the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits legally distinguish between the religious freedom claims of 
individuals, keyed to universal discourses on religious beliefs and 
rights of private conscience, and those asserted by association with 
the distinctive political status of federally recognized tribes and the 
cultural and religious heritage that are woven into peoplehood. 
If courts have emphasized the political, rather than racial, 
identity of those Native people eligible for Eagle Act exemptions, 
they have also distinguished the political from the religious aspects 
of that identity, as elaborated in the Maine case cited in Antoine.186 
In Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Erwin Rupert, a 
white pastor of an “all race” church that follows Native American 
religious customs, asserted that he had organized a religious 
community fashioned as the “Tribe of the Pahana,” a loose 
reference to a Hopi prophecy.187 When a permit application citing 
his tribal identity as Pahana was turned down, Rupert challenged 
the Eagle Act as a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause, citing an unconstitutional “denominational preference” for 
some Native American religious groups against his own.188 The 
First Circuit affirmed the District Court for Maine in holding 
against Rupert,189 drawing distinctions that have informed courts’ 
reluctance to grant Establishment Clause challenges to the  
statutory religious exemption won by tribes in 1994 for peyote use 
and for federal accommodations to Native communities in the 
management of sacred places on public lands.190 
What about the many sincere non-Native practitioners whose 
practice of Native religions is in demonstrable relationship to 
recognized tribal communities, or who marry tribal members and 
raise children in the traditions of those Native communities? In a 
 
 186. Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 187. Id. at 33. 
 188. Id. 
 189. The First Circuit cited Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) and United States v. 
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977), to suggest that the “rational basis” or “rational relationship” 
was sufficient to tie the government’s treatment of “Native Americans differently from 
others in a manner that arguably creates a religious classification” to its compelling interest 
in “protecting a dwindling and precious eagle population and protecting Native American 
religion and culture. Rupert, 957 F.2d at 35. 
 190. Id. at 32. 
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cluster of cases centered on Hardman and Wilgus that took nine 
decisions and thirteen years to wend their way through courts, the 
Tenth Circuit showed its uneasiness with the quick work the other 
three circuits had made of such religious freedom claims in favor of 
established federal Indian law.191 If the Tenth Circuit ultimately 
came along with them in its fifth and final 2011 decision in Wilgus, 
it wrestled more directly with the question of supporting the 
collective tribal rights to religious traditions at the expense of 
individual rights: 
This case requires us to navigate the treacherous terrain at the 
intersection of the federal government’s obligations, on the one 
hand, to refrain from imposing burdens on the individual’s 
practice of religion, and, on the other, to protect key aspects of our 
natural heritage and preserve the culture of Native 
American tribes.192 
B. United States v. Hardman and United States v. Wilgus 
A network that went up and down courts in the Tenth Circuit 
illustrates well the complexity of weighing accommodations meant 
to protect tribal collective religions with the individual rights to 
practitioners of Native religion.  Beginning in the late 1990s, the 
Tenth Circuit heard three different cases on appeal from district 
courts in Utah and New Mexico, and in three-judge-panel decisions 
affirmed the conviction of two and threw out the conviction of the 
third. In each case the question of religious freedom claims became 
a question of identity and of the consequent justifiability of a 
permitting process that privileged members of federally recognized 
Indian tribes above other sincere practitioners of Native 
American religions. 
Raymond Hardman was non-Native, though his ex-wife and 
two children were enrolled members in a Washington tribe, and he 
lived on a Utah reservation.193 In 1993, after he had brought his 
children’s maternal grandfather to Arizona for ceremonial burial, 
he was given eagle feathers to hang in the truck for cleansing 
 
 191. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardman, 
297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002).  
 192. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1277. 
 193. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1118–19. 
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purposes. Upon return to Utah, Hardman approached the 
Wildlife Division for a permit, but was told he would not qualify 
and was found by a magistrate judge to be in violation of the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, a decision that was affirmed by a 
federal district court.194 
Like Hardman, Samuel Ray Wilgus was not of Native descent. 
Raised a Baptist, he became in the 1980s a practitioner of Native 
religions and received religious instruction from Southern Paiute 
tribal members who were leaders in the Native American 
Church.195 In 1998, Wilgus was arrested for possessing 141 eagle 
feathers, several of which had been given him to mark his religious 
progress in the Native American Church. Wilgus challenged his 
conviction as a violation of his religious freedom.  
A third litigant, Jose Luis Saenz, a lineal descendant of the 
Chiricahua Apache, was not an enrolled member of any recognized 
tribe. Historically, many Chiricahua were absorbed into other 
Apache communities, but the community itself has not been 
formally recognized as a tribe.196 In 1996, law officials searching his 
home on another matter seized ceremonial items that included 
eagle feathers for which he did not have a permit. Although the 
criminal charges against him were dropped, he petitioned for the 
return of the confiscated feathers, which was the issue in the case.197 
The District Court for New Mexico ordered the return of the 
feathers based on its interpretation of the religious exception for 
Indian tribes under the Eagle Act. The United States appealed, 
saying the court had not deferred to the executive branch’s 
narrower interpretation of the Eagle Act as applying to members of 
federally recognized tribes. A three-judge panel in 2001 agreed 
with the District Court, affirming Saenz’s right, under RFRA, to the 
returned feathers.198 
 
 194. Id.; United States v. Hardman, No. 99-CR-166-B (D. Utah 1999); Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12.  Although he brought a RFRA defense in the appeal of the 
magistrate’s decision to the district court, his subsequent appeal turned on discriminatory 
enforcement under the equal protection clause and on the First Amendment Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses. 
 195. United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (D. Utah 2009). 
 196. Hardman, 297 F. 3d at 1119–20. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 1118–20. 
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The Tenth Circuit decided to vacate its 2001 panel rulings in 
each case for a rehearing en banc. In 2002, it released a decision 
that affirmed Saenz’s RFRA right to the returned feathers. In the 
cases of Hardman and Wilgus, the Tenth Circuit agreed the U.S. 
had compelling interests of protecting eagles and of “preserving 
Native American culture and religion in-and-of-themselves and 
in fulfilling trust obligations to Native Americans,”199 but 
concluded the government had insufficiently demonstrated that 
the permitting process was the least restrictive means to 
advance those compelling interests, leaving “far too many 
questions unanswered.”200 
Specifically the court found only “speculative” the 
government’s claim that opening up eligibility to all “sincere 
practitioners of Native American faiths that hold eagle feathers 
sacred,” regardless of their racial identity or political status, would 
“result in an increased wait substantial enough to endanger Native 
American cultures” requiring factual knowledge about the 
numbers of people involved, and the effect of the resurgence of 
eagles on the supply for the repository system.201 
Significantly, the Tenth Circuit also volunteered a potential 
rethinking of Native American religions as religions. It pondered 
the possibility that extending the eagle permit process to any 
sincere practitioner of a Native American religion, whatever race or 
political status, might allow “a wider variety of people to 
participate in Native American religion,” and “foster Native 
American culture and religion by exposing it to a wider array of 
persons.”202 It thus remanded the combined Hardman and Wilgus 
cases back to district court to gather more facts in pursuit of settling 
these questions.203 
A concurring opinion expressed concern that the district court 
would be misled in its inquiry on remand. Judges Murphy and 
Briscoe found unclear the “contours of the government’s 
compelling interest in protecting Native American culture,”204 
 
 199. Id. at 1129. 
 200. Id. at 1134. 
 201. Id. at 1133. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1131. 
 204. Id. at 1138 n.3 (Murphy & Briscoe, JJ., concurring) 
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taking issue with the trajectory suggested by the court’s suggestion 
that Native American religions would be protected and 
strengthened by opening their practice up to any and all: 
The majority intimates that the interest can be limited to the 
maintenance of the viability of Native American cultural practices 
as a historical legacy within the contours of our modern 
culture. . . . Under this view, the government’s interest in 
protecting Native American culture would be furthered to the 
exact same extent if the available supply of eagle parts were 
distributed equally to all adherents of relevant Native American 
religions, without regard to whether the adherents were, in fact, 
Native Americans.205 
The concurring judges saw the contours of the government’s 
interest “a little differently: guaranteeing members of sovereign 
and semi-autonomous Indian nations the ability to carry on their 
traditional way of life” and clarified the government’s task on 
remand to garner evidence that further delay in providing eagle 
feathers would “hinder the ability of Native Americans to engage 
in their traditional way of life.”206 
On remand, the District Court for Utah took in facts and expert 
testimony estimating populations of both eagles and adherents of 
Native religions, together with their likely identities to assess the 
impacts of extending eligibility to non-members of recognized 
tribes and considered two alternative regulatory schemes: the one 
that Wilgus’s lawyers suggested, extending management of 
repository feathers to the recognized tribes, and also one of the 
court’s own making, extending permit eligibility to all sincere 
practitioners whatever their identity. 
Holding in 2009 that the latter alternative was a less restrictive 
means for the government to pursue its compelling interest,207 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1153 (D. Utah 2009). The judge 
found Wilgus’s suggested alternative regulatory scheme, allowing enrolled members of 
federally recognized tribes to give their feathers to whomever they like, unworkable because 
it was impossible to enforce. But he found persuasive that another discussed alternative, 
allowing non-Native adherents to apply directly to the Repository, would be a less restrictive 
means, since natural resource managers could ask any nonnative to produce a permit, and 
since government concerns that a black market would ensue are speculative. 
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Federal District Judge Dee Benson ruled that the Eagle Act as 
applied to Hardman and Wilgus violated RFRA.208 In so doing, 
Judge Benson extended the reconceptualization of Native 
American religion even beyond that countenanced by the Tenth 
Circuit’s 2002 decision,209 and certainly disregarded the cautionary 
direction of Judge Murphy’s concurring opinion.210 Judge Benson 
concluded that the newly gathered evidence, including scholarship 
on Native American religions, only further complicated the 
government’s calculus about the religious interests of recognized 
tribes: “Native American religions are neither hierarchical nor 
homogenous, and there is considerable disagreement among tribes 
holding eagle feathers sacred regarding the appropriate role—if 
any—of persons who are not tribal members in tribal worship.”211 
Citing a 2003 meeting of Arvol Looking Horse, the Lakota 
Keeper of the White Buffalo Calf Pipe, and other northern plains 
spiritual leaders discussing the “protection from the abuse and 
exploitation of our ceremonies,” the judge noted “abundant 
evidence . . . that some tribes do not welcome the participation of 
non-Native Americans in traditional Native American religious 
practices.”212 But citing a response to that declaration by leaders of 
a Sun Dance that welcomed non-Natives, the judge noted the 
“equally vehement conviction of other individuals and tribes that 
individual belief is enough to warrant inclusion in Native 
American religious rituals.” Following the testimony of Raymond 
Bucko, a scholar of Native American religions, the judge concluded 
“[t]here is no single, coherent approach even within a particular 
tribe as to whether non-Native American adherents should be 
permitted to participate in Native American religions and possess 
the eagle feathers necessary to do so fully.”213 Noting that Wilgus 
and Hardman’s religious practice was connected to Native 
community members, the judge asserted: 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. United States v. Hardman 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 210. Id. at 1136-40 (Murphy & Briscoe, JJ. concurring). 
 211. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. 
 212. Id. at 1136–37. 
 213. Id. at 1138. 
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The Paiutes of Cedar City and the Hopi Tribe in Arizona who 
gave feathers to Mr. Wilgus and Mr. Hardman would presumably 
feel that a permitting system that allowed them to transfer 
feathers to those they deemed worthy protected and promoted 
their culture and religious beliefs. . . . Other tribes would no doubt 
feel their interests harmed . . . . Whatever policy it chooses, the 
government will have furthered its compelling interest with 
regard to some tribes and frustrated it with regard to others.214 
“The government’s task of fostering Native American culture is 
a perilous one,” Judge Benson wrote.215 
Noting that Judge Benson’s 2009 ruling moved even further 
from holdings in the other appellate courts, the United States 
appealed in the case of Wilgus.216 In 2011, a three-judge panel of the 
Tenth Circuit reversed in favor of the United States and 
against Wilgus. 
Procedurally, the 2011 decision took into account the Tenth 
Circuit’s 2009 holding in United States v. Friday, that the least 
restrictive means analysis would not be merely a question of fact 
but one of law, and deepened its review of the lower court’s 
reasoning.217 But the key move made by the panel in 2011 was to 
settle on a controlling interpretation of the government’s 
compelling interest with regard to protecting Native American 
religion, which presented two different options as it came out of the 
en banc decision in Hardman. The 2011 decision opted for the 
“protection of the culture of federally-recognized Indian tribes” as 
the controlling construal of the trust responsibility, rather than the 
language in the majority opinion of its holding in Hardman: that of 
“preserving Native American culture in-and–of-[itself]” potentially 
“as a thing separate and apart from those Indian tribes to whom the 
government owes a trust obligation.”218 The 2011 Wilgus court 
found this not only in better keeping with the initial formulation in 
Hardman, citing the typical grounding for the special federal 
relationship with the tribes and  the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Morton v. Mancari and other Indian law cases, but also with its 
 
 214. Id. at 1139. 
 215. Id. at 1139 n.10. 
 216. The United States did not appeal in the case of Hardman, perhaps because of his 
having children who were members of a federally recognized tribe. 
 217. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 218. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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interpretation of congressional purpose in the Eagle Act itself, 
noting the statute authorizes permits 
“for the religious purposes of Indian tribes” [when it could have 
read] “for the purposes of Native American religion.” Such 
wording would have been a clear indication to courts that 
Congress saw itself as protecting and promoting Native American 
religion per se, rather than as expressed in the religion of 
federally-recognized tribal members. But Congress specifically 
chose to tie the exception to “Indian tribes,” rather than individual 
practitioners. From this we infer that Congress saw the statutory 
exception not as protecting Native American religion qua 
religion, but rather as working to preserve the culture and religion 
of federally-recognized tribes.219 
The 2011 Wilgus Court also elaborated on the implications of 
embedding its understanding of the compelling interest in the 
religious exemption to the Eagle Act in keeping with the principles 
of federal Indian law made clear in Mancari. The first implication is 
that this steers clear of Fourteenth Amendment challenges: 
[E]ven though we are not considering an equal protection or due 
process attack on the Eagle Act, we note that the language of the 
exception to the possession ban in the Eagle Act refers specifically 
to “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.” 16 U.S.C. § 668a. The 
Act thus draws a distinction between Native Americans and non-
Native Americans based on the “quasi-sovereign” status of 
the tribes.220 
The second implication is that the holding steers clear of 
violations of the Establishment Clause, based on the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Mancari that federally recognized tribes are 
political, rather than religious or racial, in nature.221 
Having clarified its controlling interpretation of the 
government’s compelling interest in protecting religions of 
federally recognized tribes, the three judge panel turned to the least 
 
 219. Id. at 1286 (emphasis omitted). 
 220. Id.  at 1286–87. 
 221. To this, in a note, the implication was added that this interpretation of federally 
recognized tribal religions keeps the courts from having to make the choice the district court 
had signaled between advancing some and frustrating some religious interests of federally 
recognized tribes with different postures toward non-Native adherents. Id. at 1288 n.5. 
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restrictive means analysis and considered an alternative raised by 
Wilgus to let enrolled members of recognized tribes determine 
whether they can grant feathers to others.222 The panel also 
considered an alternative to open the permit process to all sincere 
adherents of Native religions, the option identified as less 
restrictive by the district court.223 The former alternative was 
discounted as unenforceable and conducive to developing a black 
market; the latter was seen to depart from the compelling interest 
as interpreted by the Tenth Circuit. It would “harm the very 
population that [the exemption] was designed to help” by 
increasing already lengthy wait times, “[a]nd it would do so in 
order to help non-tribal practitioners of Native American religion, 
a group not encompassed within the compelling governmental 
interest supporting the Eagle Act.”224 
The court found the current permit process to be the least 
restrictive means: “[b]y allowing only members of federally-
recognized tribes an essential though otherwise prohibited 
commodity (eagle feathers and parts), the United States ensures 
that those tribes are able to continue to practice their traditional 
culture to the greatest extent possible.”225 
C. Courts Recognizing Collective Rights to Native Religions 
In the Eagle Act accommodation cases, we have a sustained, 
decade-long conversation about what manner of thing a Native 
American religion is, translated into the technical language of the 
law in cases forced to make difficult judgments involving 
competing claims to Native American religious exercise. 
The First, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits chose to view the 
asserted religious freedom claims through the refracting lens of 
established federal Indian law, with its insistence on tribal 
identities as political, not racial or religious, and rooted in collective 
rights based in treaty obligations and a federal trust obligation to 
 
 222. Because the alternative that the district court had chosen emerged in the 
proceedings but was presented by neither party, the Tenth Circuit challenged the district 
court’s conclusion that another regulatory scheme was less restrictive. “A statute that asks 
whether a regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving an end is not an open-ended 
invitation to the judicial imagination.” Id. at 1289. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1293. 
 225. Id. at 1295. 
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members of those tribes. Through the proverbial back door of 
established Indian law, these courts have determined that the 
collective rights of tribes to their particular Native religions would 
outweigh the religious rights of individual practitioners of Native 
religions. It is also true that the claims to religious freedom by Fire 
Bird Gibson, Cowichan Salish Canadian Leonard Antoine, Ray 
Hardman, and Samuel Ray Wilgus were found sincere and 
troublingly burdened. This reiterates that Native American 
religions were not matters of collective rights alone, but practices 
and communities that could extend beyond the boundaries of tribal 
membership. If all this is true and (for the moment) settled, the 
cases also show how contingent are those references to the 
collective rights to religion when squared with individual rights to 
Native religions by Native Americans whose claims do not clearly 
align with the federally recognized tribes. 
Contingent, indeed. Still pursuing his religious rights to take an 
eagle for the Northern Arapaho Sun Dance after the Tenth Circuit 
had rebuffed his efforts to undo a conviction for a previous eagle 
hunt,226 Winslow Friday—or rather the Northern Arapaho Tribe on 
his behalf—sought a permit in 2009 to take two bald eagles for 
ceremonial purposes on the Wind River Reservation, a reservation 
which is complexly shared by two tribes, the Eastern Shoshone and 
Friday’s Northern Arapaho. As the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
was processing the Northern Arapaho Tribe’s application for a 
permit, the Eastern Shoshone Tribe raised an issue with a 
contemplated permit, citing that tribe’s cultural and religious 
objections to eagle hunting on the reservation and the compelling 
government interest of the federal government’s trust 
responsibility to preserve and protect its tribal religion.227 The Fish 
and Wildlife Service made a compromise determination, allowing 
“the [Northern Arapaho Tribe] to take a live eagle for religious 
purposes in a manner that would avoid . . . burdening the religious 
and cultural beliefs and practices of the [Eastern Shoshone Tribe]” 
 
 226. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008). Friday was prevented from 
acquiring an eagle through the permit and distribution process under BGEPA, citing the 
need for a ritually pure eagle. 
 227. N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1165-66 (D. Wyo. 2015). 
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and issuing a permit for taking two bald eagles within Wyoming, 
but expressly not on the Wind River Reservation.228 
When the Northern Arapaho Tribe challenged the agency’s 
decision under the Free Exercise Clause, the Federal District Court 
for Wyoming agreed that Northern Arapaho free exercise rights 
were violated in the compromise decision, drawing support from 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby and Holt to expressly 
rethink a 2012 district court determination that an Arapaho man’s 
rights under RFRA were not violated because the compromise 
was “the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling 
governmental interests in protecting eagle populations and in 
protecting the religions and cultures of both the [Northern 
Arapaho Tribe] and the [Eastern Shoshone Tribe].”229 Specifically, 
the rethinking turned on the proper weighing of the compelling 
government interest of “fostering and protecting the culture and 
religion of federally-recognized Indian tribes” established in 
Hardman in light of the Supreme Court’s clarification of 
compelling government interest in Hobby Lobby and Holt.230 I note 
that Hobby Lobby and Holt, evaluations of RFRA and RLUIPA did 
not address the value of a compelling government interest to the 
First Amendment. 
The Wyoming opinion drew support from a case in Texas that 
had led to the Fifth Circuit’s 2014 reevaluation, in light of Hobby 
Lobby, of the logic of Hardman and Wilgus in support of the federal 
government’s restriction of eagle feather access under the Eagle Act 
to members of federally recognized tribes. In this case, McAllen 
Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, a member of the federally 
unrecognized Lipan Apache tribe and pastor of a church that 
engages in renewal of Native American traditions, brought a 
religious freedom challenge that a district court found inconsistent 
 
 228. Id. (citing the record at 533). 
 229. Id. at 1167.  Ashe noted that a November 5, 2012, Court Order affirming “the 
current permit reflects the least restrictive means of furthering the [Defendants’] compelling 
interests.” Id. An additional claim under the Administrative Procedure Act was rejected by 
the district court.  
 230. Id. at 30, 37. The District Court for Wyoming also cited Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), a RFRA case, as prompting a rethinking of 
the compelling government interest of preserving and protecting the religions and cultures 
of federally recognized tribes, but failed to acknowledge the Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of 
this Hardman logic in its 2011 ruling in Wilgus, which did not view O Centro in this light. 
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with the case law considered above.231 But on appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit reversed and remanded, drawing on developments from 
Hobby Lobby to chart a different direction in weighing the 
compelling interest of the federal trust responsibility. In its 
regulations, the Fifth Circuit found: 
[T]he government must show that the challenged law as applied to 
the claimant satisfies the compelling interest . . . . Therefore, 
“general statements of its interests” are not sufficient to demonstrate 
a compelling governmental interest; rather, the interests need to 
be closely tailored to the law. Where a regulation already provides 
an exception from the law for a particular group, the government 
will have a higher burden in showing that the law, as applied, 
furthers the compelling interest.232 
Noting that the United States had argued its accommodations 
under the Eagle Act do not spell out a group right, per se, since they 
apply to individual tribal members, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless 
emphatically endorsed the compelling interest of the federal trust 
responsibility to “Indian tribes.” The Fifth Circuit observed that 
“‘Indian tribes’ in this particular section” were not defined by 
Congress when it created the Eagle Act accommodation in 1962. But 
because “the [Interior] Department’s approach has not been 
entirely uniform on this,” the court found, “we cannot definitively 
conclude that Congress intended to protect only federally 
recognized tribe members’ religious rights in this section.”233 
The Fifth Circuit took pains also to align its recognition of 
Pastor Soto’s rights in terms of his membership in the Lipan Apache 
Tribe, and to note that while that tribe is not currently federally 
recognized, it is recognized in the Texas State Senate, and by 
reference to an 1838 Treaty, has “lived in Texas and Northern 
Mexico for 300 years and . . . had a ‘government to government’ 
relationship with the Republic of Texas, the State of Texas, and the 
United States government.”234 The Court also noted that the Lipan 
Apache tribe, as a non-profit, was, among the four hundred 
 
 231. McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 232. Id. at 472 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 233. Id. at 473. 
 234. Id. at 473–74 (citing S. Con. Res. 438, 81st Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2009)). 
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federally unrecognized tribes, one of only fifty that had received 
federal funding.235 
The limited nature of this ruling is underscored in Judge 
Jones’s concurrence: 
Soto is without dispute an Indian and a member and regular 
participant in the Lipan Apache Tribe, which, although not 
federally recognized, has long historical roots in Texas. The panel 
opinion discusses—and is also limited by—Soto’s RFRA claim 
based on his and his tribe’s status. No more should be read into 
the RFRA protection intended by this decision. Both the 
conservation of eagles and the way of life of federally recognized 
Indian tribes are of signal national importance, as indicated by 
decades of federal law and regulations. . . . Broadening the 
universe of “believers” who seek eagle feathers might then 
seriously endanger the religious practices of real Native 
Americans. Soto’s status does not eliminate the potential 
problems, which will be explored at trial, but cabins this case to 
Native American co-religionists.236 
In this regard, the Fifth Circuit draws on Hobby Lobby to bring 
heightened attention to some of the contradictions of the federal 
recognition process and to, in effect, extend the logic of the nation-
to-nation trust responsibility with Indian tribes in a particular case, 
rather than to elevate rights to the mere practice of a Native 
American religion by non-Native practitioners in general. In other 
words, McAllen adds weight to eagle feather claims by members of 
non-recognized tribes with compelling cases toward recognition, 
like state recognition or treaties, and may steer Eagle Act 
enforcement and administration accordingly. Indeed after the Fifth 
Circuit’s reversal and remand to the district court, Interior 
Secretary Sally Jewell signed a settlement agreement with Pastor 
Soto and specifically listed members of his church and three other 
groups involved in the litigation, recognizing their right to possess 
eagle feathers and their eligibility to apply to the repository for 
further eagle parts.237 Although the agreement committed the 
 
 235. Id. at 474 n.12 (citing U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-348, Indian Issues: 
Federal Funding for Non-Federally Recognized Tribes 10 (2012)). 
 236. Id. at 480 (Jones, J., concurring). 
 237. Settlement Agreement, McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7:07-cv-
00060 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2016). 
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Interior Secretary to consider and seek public comment on a 
petition to modify the existing Eagle Act regulations, the agreement 
also contained the reach of any exemptions to those regulations at 
this time to the listed members of the Grace Brethren Church, the 
Native American New Life Center, the San Antonio Indian 
Fellowship, and the South Texas Indian Dancers Association. Such 
would presumably not extend to non-native practitioners asserting 
solo claims or for such self-proclaimed tribal entities as Erwin 
Rupert’s Tribe of Pahana.238 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLLECTIVE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS  
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
If the Eagle Act accommodation cases are potentially seen as 
mere instances of judicial reasoning about Native religions as 
group rights sneaking in through the back door, and in ways that 
were explicitly locked out of the house in the Ninth Circuit’s San 
Francisco Peaks decision discussed above, we can turn more 
forthrightly to the front door reasoning of international human 
rights law, especially as clarified in the 2007 U.N. Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).239 Although the category of 
religion has received less elaboration in international human rights 
law as it has in the context of U.S. law, UNDRIP makes very clear 
that where indigenous peoples are concerned, rights to religion 
must be seen as collective as well as individual.240 
Religious freedom is of course consistently articulated in the 
major international human rights instruments. Article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) provides that: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
 
 238. See Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 239. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 24. Here I will not elaborate on two other relevant 
instruments, the International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
169 (1989) and the Organization of American States’ Working Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. 
 240. For implications of applying UNDRIP to domestic U.S. law, see WALTER R. ECHO-
HAWK, IN THE LIGHT OF JUSTICE 222–79 (2013). 
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practice, worship and observance.”241 Article 4(2) of the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1976), 
ratified by the United States, clarifies that rights of religious 
conscience are, along with rights to life, freedom from slavery and 
torture, among the non-derogable rights that cannot be suspended 
in states of emergency.242 
But the legal force for indigenous peoples of human rights to 
religion has been very much qualified in international law. This 
owes, in part, to a substantive problem: indigenous claims to 
traditional lands, traditional livelihoods, and traditional forms of 
governance can be meaningfully religious, and not simply or 
plainly economic, political, or cultural. It owes also to a structural 
problem: that indigenous peoples as peoples are betwixt and 
between the effective units of international human rights law. On 
the one hand, the nation states under Article 1 of both the ICCPR 
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights are the “peoples” with rights of self-determination, but are 
individuals within those nation states who enjoy human rights on 
the other. Even as aggregates of such individuals with 
internationally recognized “minority rights,” indigenous peoples 
and their claims have often been illegible.243 
But in the last decades, international human rights law is 
increasingly recognizing that such universal human rights, in order 
truly to be universal, must apply in distinctive ways to the world’s 
indigenous peoples as collective rights. The UNDRIP, with its 
insistence on rights of peoples, not merely indigenous people, 
makes this boldly plain. UNDRIP begins as follows in Article I: 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a 
collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human 
rights law.”244 
 
 241. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
 242. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4(2), Dec. 19, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 243. For a fuller discussion, see Michael D. McNally, Religion as Peoplehood: Native 
American Religious Traditions and the Discourse of Indigenous Rights, in HANDBOOK OF 
INDIGENOUS RELIGION(S) 52 (Greg Johnson & Siv Ellen Kraft eds., 2017). 
 244. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 24, at art. 1. 
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The Declaration engages, rather than avoids, the category of 
religion in its elaboration of collective rights, but unlike the terse 
words of the First Amendment religion clauses and other human 
rights instruments, the Declaration elaborates on what protection 
of “religious traditions” might entail in terms of the collective 
practices of indigenous communities. Article 12 reads: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop 
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and 
ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in 
privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use 
and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the 
repatriation of their human remains.245 
And this more explicit elaboration on rights pertaining to 
religious and spiritual traditions follows a broader discussion of 
cultural rights in Article 11: “Indigenous peoples have the right to 
practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This 
includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present 
and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological 
and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and 
visual and performing arts and literature.”246 
If these two articles key into its specifically religious provisions, 
UNDRIP does not content itself with a view of indigenous religions 
as merely or plainly religious. In fact, religious or spiritual 
considerations are clearly mentioned in five other provisions 
protecting various elements of culture247 and implicitly present in 
further considerations of rights to oral traditions, philosophies, and 
languages,248 culturally inflected medicine,249 and traditional 
ecological knowledge.250 Most salient here is UNDRIP’s explicit 
recognition in Article 25 of rights to “maintain and strengthen” an 
indigenous people’s “spiritual relationship” with traditional 
“lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and 
 
 245. Id. at art. 12. 
 246. Id. at art. 11. 
 247. Id. at arts. 25, 31, 34–36. For a fuller discussion, see McNally, supra note 194. 
 248. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 24, art. 13. 
 249. Id. at art. 24. 
 250. Id. at art. 31. 
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to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in 
this regard.”251 
When UNDRIP was adopted nearly unanimously by the 
General Assembly in 2007, the United States was alone with 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in refusing to do so. But in 
2010, the United States formally adopted UNDRIP with 
reservations, but with no reservations directly related to religious 
or cultural matters. Indeed in the accompanying statement, the U.S 
committed itself to: 
[P]romoting and protecting the collective rights of indigenous 
peoples as well as the human rights of all individuals. The United 
States underlines its support for the Declaration’s recognition in 
the preamble that indigenous individuals are entitled without 
discrimination to all human rights recognized in international 
law, and that indigenous peoples possess certain additional, 
collective rights. The United States reads all of the provisions of 
the Declaration in light of this understanding of human rights and 
collective rights.252 
Angela Riley and Kristen Carpenter have offered framing of 
how international institutions, domestic nations, and indigenous 
peoples themselves are operationalizing the aspirations of UNDRIP 
in this “jurisgenerative moment.”253 Perhaps most important are 
the subtle ways that the language and norms of UNDRIP gain legal 
traction as they gradually come to animate the arguments and 
conversations about indigenous rights at each level. I won’t 
elaborate fully here, except to point out that at the international 
level, the United Nations has taken important structural steps to 
hardwire indigenous peoples’ representation into its work.  This 
occurs through bodies like the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
the newly charged Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, through high profile events like the 2014 World 
 
 251. Id. at art. 25. 
 252. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Jan. 12, 2011) https://2009 
-2017.state.gov/s/srgia/154553.htm. 
 253. Kristen Carpenter & Angela R. Riley. Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative 
Moment in Human Rights, 102 CAL. L. REV. 173 (2014). 
 
005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  10:16 AM 
205 Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right 
 275 
Conference on Indigenous Peoples at the General Assembly,254 and 
more focused measures to incorporate indigenous issues centrally 
into the work of the U.N.255 
There is not yet express elaboration in UNDRIP or its 
implementation apparatus as to how religious rights of indigenous 
peoples are to be implemented as collective rights. And if, in the 
near term, U.S. courts are reluctant to engage the non-binding 
UNDRIP in their interpretation of U.S. law,256the clarifications of 
the Declaration can, and increasingly will, inform the making of U.S. 
law and policies in recognizing the collective nature of Native 
American religious freedom. 
V. BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. (2014) 
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that under RFRA, the 
religious exercise of three closely held corporations was unlawfully 
burdened by the contraceptive mandate under the Affordable Care 
Act, and the 5-4 decision—one of “startling breadth” in the view of 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent—turned on a holding that closely held 
for-profit corporations are “persons” capable of “religious 
exercise” that triggers RFRA’s strict scrutiny analysis 
when burdened.257 
 
 254. See G.A. Res. 69/2 (Sept. 22, 2014). U.N. General Assembly, Outcome Document 
of the High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly Known as the World Conference 
on Indigenous Peoples, A/Res/69/2 (22 September, 2014). This document includes the 
revised mandate of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to better 
promote and monitor the operationalizing of UNDRIP. 
 255. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 71/321 (Sept. 8, 2017) U.N. General Assembly, Enhancing the 
Participation of Indigenous Peoples’ Representatives and Institutions in Meetings of Relevant United 
Nations Bodies on Issues Affecting Them A/71/L.82 (Sept. 2017). Consider also how indigenous 
concerns increasingly inform the periodic review, monitoring, and reporting mechanisms 
related to other U.N. instruments like the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. Id. 
 256. A brief database search survey of 59 federal court cases that invoke UNDRIP were 
overwhelmingly dismissive, often with pro se litigants raising the Declaration in a decidedly 
non-starter manner. Still, a good case can be made that UNDRIP clarifies how religious rights 
are properly to be seen as collective, not just individual, under binding human rights 
instruments like ICCPR and the UDHR. 
 257. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding that the religious 
freedom of a retail chain with 13,000 employees, which is owned by a family that believes 
life begins at conception, and the religious freedom of two other corporations was unlawfully 
violated by the contraception coverage requirement under the Affordable Care Act).  
Affordable Care Act of 2010, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2); §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2). 
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The Hobby Lobby ruling clears ground in two important respects 
for courts’ consideration of Native American religious exercise 
claims under RFRA as matters of collective, not just individual, 
religious liberty. First, the Hobby Lobby Court proposed a novel 
reading of RFRA not merely as a restorative action following Smith 
but as a law passed “in order to provide very broad protection for 
religious liberty,” indeed extending beyond protections the 
Supreme Court had allowed for First Amendment free exercise 
accommodations prior to its 1990 decision in Smith.258 Second, on 
the premise of this expansive view of Congress’s intent in RFRA, 
the Court held that RFRA’s language of “persons,” whose religious 
exercise implicates RFRA, could include for-profit corporations.259 
In substantiating that view against the arguments of a vigorous 
dissent and considerably settled matters of corporate law, the 
Hobby Lobby Court elaborates on the nature of a corporation’s 
religious exercise to suggest that for-profit corporations, like the 
many religious congregations and religious associations that 
organize as non-profits, exercise religion that is more than the sum 
of the aggregate parts. In other words, as an artificial person, the 
corporation is not simply an individual, but a collective entity. 
A. RFRA’s Expansive Reach in Hobby Lobby 
To orient its settling of the key legal question in Hobby Lobby of 
whether a closely held for-profit corporation could qualify as a 
“person” whose religious exercise was protected under RFRA, the 
Supreme Court took the position that Congress passed RFRA to 
“provide very broad protection for religious liberty,” that 
“Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is 
constitutionally required,”260 and that RFRA did more than merely 
restore the compelling government interest analysis that had held 
sway in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment free exercise 
jurisprudence prior to its 1990 Smith decision. In other words, to 
square the conclusion that at least certain for-profit corporations 
have religious liberty rights despite the Supreme Court’s explicit 
rejection of such claims under the First Amendment,261 the Hobby 
 
 258. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693. 
 259. Id., slip. op. at 19–31. 
 260. Id. at 684, 706. 
 261. Id. at 739–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Lobby Court had to assert that the legislated religious freedom 
protections of RFRA were meant to go beyond those of the First 
Amendment as the Supreme Court had allowed them before Smith. 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg identified this as an “errant premise” 
after which the Court “falters at each step of its analysis.” Justice 
Ginsburg wrote, “[p]ersuaded that Congress enacted RFRA to 
serve a far less radical purpose, and mindful of the havoc the 
Court’s judgment can introduce, I dissent.”262 
If this was a puzzling departure from the High Court’s two 
previous rulings on RFRA, in which it had taken pains to either 
contain the statute’s reach by finding it unconstitutional as applied 
to the states263 or as only providing narrow protections to generally 
applicable federal laws,264 the very departure in Hobby Lobby carries 
significant implications for the concerns of this Article. 
To return to the San Francisco Peaks case, the Ninth Circuit 
majority in Navajo Nation had taken the approach of the Hobby Lobby 
dissent that the proper context for interpreting RFRA’s language of 
“substantial burden” was a narrow congressional intent that RFRA 
simply restore the status quo ante of First Amendment free exercise 
jurisprudence prior to Smith. The Ninth Circuit turned to Lyng, 
which predated Smith by two years, as the controlling precedent for 
the interpretation of “substantial burden.”265 Because the Lyng 
court had found that government approval of a logging road 
through precincts sacred to three California claimant tribes did not 
“prohibit” their First Amendment protected free exercise, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that the threshold of a “substantial burden” of 
religious exercise under RFRA was not crossed by government 
approval of a ski area’s snowmaking with treated wastewater on a 
mountain sacred to the claimant tribes. And despite a varying 
holding on that legal question in a Tenth Circuit sacred land 
decision,266 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2009.267 
 
 262. Id. at 740 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 263. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 264. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006). 
 265. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1071-74 (9th Cir. 2008); Hobby 
Lobby, 573 U.S. at 748–49 (Ginsburg, dissenting). 
 266. Comanche Nation v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Okla. 2008). 
 267. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009) (per curiam), cert. denied. 
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Faced with a fairly plain narrative that RFRA followed Smith 
directly and was expressly intended to restore the First 
Amendment free exercise jurisprudence on neutral laws of general 
applicability which the Court took away in Smith, the Hobby Lobby 
Court supported its expansive interpretation of congressional 
intent in RFRA on two bases. First, against a conventional view that 
its decision in City of Boerne restricted RFRA by declaring it 
unconstitutional as applied to the states, the Hobby Lobby majority 
found in that holding an acknowledgment of RFRA’s broad reach 
as applied to the federal government: “[w]e held that Congress had 
overstepped its Section 5 authority because ‘[t]he stringent test 
RFRA demands’ ‘far exceeds any pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as 
interpreted in Smith.’”268 
Where the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg, who had 
joined the City of Boerne decision argued otherwise on this point, 
the Hobby Lobby majority asserted that the “stringent test” in 
question, the least restrictive means test, did not inhere in pre-Smith 
free exercise precedent.269 Justice Ginsburg found in error the City 
of Boerne’s decision that the least restrictive means requirement 
“was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence that RFRA purported 
to codify.”270 
Next, the Hobby Lobby Court turned to a provision of RLUIPA, 
which Congress ironically passed as a more narrowly tailored 
response to the constraints of City of Boerne. Because the provision 
amended RFRA’s definition of “religious exercise” by deleting an 
original reference to First Amendment holdings prior to Smith and 
by expanding the definition of “exercise of religion” to include “any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief,”271 the Hobby Lobby Court understood 
Congress’s intent in RFRA “to effect a complete separation from the 
First Amendment case law.”272 The Court also cited RLUIPA’s 
 
 268. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 695 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533–34). 
 269. Id. at 736. 
 270. Id. at 749–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 271. RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A). 
 272. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent found 
implausible the suggestion that RLUIPA’s alteration did more than simply relieve courts of 
the impossible task of determining the “centrality” of a particular religious exercise. Justice 
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statement that this newly defined “exercise of religion” “be 
construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the 
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this act and 
the Constitution.”273 
The following year, in Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed lower court rulings and found a Muslim 
inmate was entitled to grow a beard for religious purposes even 
though it violated the regulations of an Arkansas corrections 
facility.274 In that case, the inmate’s religious freedom claims were 
made under RLUIPA, but the High Court related the two statutes, 
noting RLUIPA thus allows “prisoners ‘to seek religious 
accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in 
RFRA.’”275 What is important for our purposes is that the 
Supreme Court in Holt found erroneous the lower courts’ appeal 
to First Amendment cases to hold that the grooming policy did 
not substantially burden Holt’s practice of Islam, underscoring 
its Hobby Lobby holding that Congress intended RFRA and 
RLUIPA to expand religious freedom protections beyond the 
First Amendment and applying that logic to the substantial 
burden analysis: 
[T]he District Court erred by concluding that the grooming 
policy did not substantially burden petitioner’s religious 
exercise because “he had been provided a prayer rug and a list 
of distributors of Islamic material, he was allowed to 
correspond with a religious advisor, and was allowed to 
maintain the required diet and observe religious holidays.” . . . 
In taking this approach, the District Court improperly 
imported a strand of reasoning from cases involving prisoners’ 
First Amendment rights.276 
 
Ginsburg cited Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring): 
“The amendment in no way suggests that Congress meant to expand the class of entities 
qualified to mount religious accommodation claims.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 748 (Ginsburg, 
J. dissenting). 
 273. RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g). 
 274. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). 
 275. Holt v. Hobbs, No. 13–6827, slip op. at 3 (U.S. 2015) (citing Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006)). 
 276. Holt, slip op. at 7 (citation omitted) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
342, 351–52 (1987) and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)). 
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When the Holt court held the particular reasoning found in 
those cases, “the availability of alternative means of practicing 
religion,” to be “a relevant consideration,” it made an important 
distinction.277 The error was not tied to this particular strand of 
reasoning, but to a strand of reasoning from cases involving 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, because “RLUIPA provides 
greater protection.”278 
B. Substantial Burdens in the Wake of Hobby Lobby 
It must be said that when afforded the opportunity in a 
similarly aligned 2016 case, courts have invoked Hobby Lobby and 
Holt to narrow, not broaden, their approach to what counts as a 
substantial burden.279 In Oklevueha Native American Church of 
Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch (2016), the Ninth Circuit found the controlled 
substance regulations did not substantially burden a religious 
group in its religiously motivated access to marijuana and trigger 
RFRA protections.280 Despite its deliberately indigenous name, 
Oklevueha only nominally aligns with Navajo Nation, since it is not a 
sacred lands case and more importantly since it involves a 
decidedly non-Native religious group.281 Notably, the “Native” 
Native American Church filed an amicus brief against the 
Oklevueha effort to associate their claims with hard won 
accommodations for the Native American Church, emphasizing 
that the Native American Church has no ceremonial regard for 
 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 7-8. 
 279. For more on how Hobby Lobby and Holt have been applied in the context of Eagle 
Act cases to broaden the RFRA religious freedom rights of individuals excluded, see supra 
note 222 for discussion of McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar (2016). 
 280. Oklevueha Native American Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1016–
18 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 281. Id. at 1012. A reasonable person visiting a webpage affiliated with the group could 
very well conclude that Oklevueha is a decidedly non-Native religious group. Membership, 
which costs $200, or $30 for members of federally recognized tribes, “provides you a means 
to receive your constitutional rights in attending earth based indigenous American Native 
spiritually empowering and healing ceremonies—especially Native American Church 
indigenous ceremonies that involve sacraments (peyote, cannabis, ayahuasca, etc [sic]) that 
are otherwise illegal for Non-Members to partake and or be in possession of.” Why Being a 
Member of Oklevueha Native American Church will Benefit You, OKLEVUEHA NATIVE AMERICAN 
CHURCH, https://nativeamericanchurches.org/joining-oklevueha-why-and-how/ (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
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marijuana.282 Nevertheless, in holding that the controlled 
substance laws did not substantially burden the Oklevueha 
practitioners, the Ninth Circuit turned to its Navajo Nation 
position that “substantial burden” be interpreted in light of Lyng: 
absent unless the government action coerces a practitioner into 
acting contrary to belief. The Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that 
Oklevueha practitioners considered Peyote their key sacrament, 
cannabis being merely a substitute and that “foregoing cannabis 
[was] not contrary to their religious beliefs.”283 
But in its effort to distinguish Oklevueha from Hobby Lobby and 
instead to tie it to Navajo Nation, a Harvard Law Review Case 
Comment argues the Ninth Circuit conflated two different senses 
of substantial burden:284  
There are at least two things that “substantial” could modify. 
First, it could be that the government has to put substantial or 
heavy pressure on you to violate your religious beliefs [such as 
the large fine in Hobby Lobby]. But it could also be that the 
government has to pressure you to violate your religious beliefs 
in some substantial or serious way. For example, maybe the 
government is asking you to violate a particularly important tenet 
of your religion, not just some discretionary one.285 
In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit found no substantial burden 
because the government action was not substantial in the manner 
of its burden; the court rejected an argument that Forest Service 
approval of the sewage to snowmaking plan forced the tribes to act 
contrary to their religion, a position that I argue above is not an 
accurate conclusion from the accepted facts in that case.286 In 
Oklevueha, however, it was the practice of using cannabis, which the 
 
 282. Brief for the National Council of Native American Churches et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellees at 8–9, Oklevueha, 828 F.3d 1012 (No. 14-15143). 
 283. Oklevueha, 828 F.3d at 1016. 
 284. Case Comment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act—Substantial Burden—Ninth 
Circuit Holds that Federal Cannabis Prohibition is Not a Substantial Burden—Oklevueha Native 
American Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 
785 (2016). 
 285. Id. (citing Chad Flanders, Substantial Confusion about “Substantial Burdens,” 27 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 28–29 (2016)). 
 286. See supra note 54. 
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court noted was non-obligatory, that was insufficiently substantial, 
not the burden of government regulation of cannabis.287 
The Case Comment goes on to argue that, by rendering its 
holding in Oklevueha as consistent with its holding in Navajo Nation, 
the Ninth Circuit “enshrined” its substantial burden standard “as 
among the most demanding in the nation by linking Navajo Nation’s 
‘act contrary’ rule to the language of religious obligation, which 
previous Ninth Circuit cases had not explicitly done.”288 
C. Whither the RFRA Claim in Standing Rock II? 
Similarly questionable logic was applied in the second round of 
the Dakota Access Pipeline case, when the D.C. District Court judge 
found the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s argument unavailing that 
Army Corps’ approval of the Missouri River pipeline crossing 
violated Lakota religious freedom rights under RFRA.289 As briefly 
discussed at the outset of this Article, the district court found 
primarily that the tribes’ request for a preliminary injunction and 
temporary restraining order was nullified by laches, since the tribes 
did not bring the RFRA claim a half year earlier in their initial 
motions for a preliminary injunction.290 But despite forceful 
arguments of the tribes that Hobby Lobby had rendered Navajo 
Nation and Lyng no longer controlling for such cases, the court 
found that the RFRA claim would be unlikely to succeed on the 
merits.291 The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe had argued, first, that 
unlike Navajo, the spiritual contamination of the only ritually pure 
water available for Lakota ceremonies would “foreclose” the 
practice of Lakota religion. Because the United States  
 
 287. Oklevueha, 828 F.3d at 1017. 
 288. Case Comment, supra note 284, at 790–91. 
 289. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (Standing 
Rock II), 239 F. Supp. 3d 77, 88 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 290. Id. at 83 (“[L]aches bars the preliminary-injunctive relief requested (but not the 
RFRA claim itself) and that the Tribe’s substantial-burden position is unlikely to achieve 
success on the merits. Having so decided, the Court need not consider the remaining three 
factors of the preliminary-injunction analysis—irreparable harm, balance of equities, and 
public interest.”). 
 291. Id. at 100 (“The Court holds that Lyng likely prevents the Tribe from showing that 
the Corps’ decision to grant an easement to Dakota Access to operate an oil pipeline under 
Lake Oahe constitutes a substantial burden on its members’ free exercise of religion. The 
Tribe, accordingly, is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its RFRA claim.”). 
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has systematically deprived the Tribe of access to other water 
sources as a function of its more than 200-yearlong campaign to 
dispossess the Lakota people of their aboriginal lands and 
resources. . . . [T]he Tribe and its members here are more closely 
analogous to the prisoners whose only options in the exercise of 
their religion are closely controlled by the government.292  
Secondly, Cheyenne River argued that where the Lyng court 
“could not vindicate Indian religious adherents’ challenge to a 
government sanctioned project on the government’s own land 
because to do so would imply in the Indian religious believer “de 
facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious public 
property,” the Lakota tribes had an “actual legal ownership interest 
in the waters of Lake Oahe” and the U.S. had “a fiduciary 
[responsibility] in the protection of those waters for the Tribe’s 
benefit.”293 Finally, and most importantly, Cheyenne River took 
pains to argue Navajo Nation was “no longer good law” in light of 
Hobby Lobby and Holt for reasons argued above, and also because, 
as in the case with Oklehueva, “the real question that RFRA presents 
is ‘whether the [government regulation] imposes a substantial 
burden on the ability of the plaintiff to [act] in accordance with their 
religious beliefs,’ not ‘whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA 
case is reasonable.’”294 
The D.C. District Court rejected these arguments, instead 
finding a direct line from Navajo Nation and especially Lyng, in 
which the court found a tight analogy: “incidental, if serious impact 
on a tribe’s295 ability to practice its religion because of spiritual 
desecration of a sacred site.”296 Remarkably, the D.C. District Court 
 
 292. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 34, Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017) 
[hereinafter CRST Motion]. 
 293. Id.  at 33–34. 
 294. Id. at 34–36 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014)) 
(brackets in the original). 
 295. Note, however, the slippage between the D.C. court’s discussion of a “tribe’s” 
religious practice and the cited rendering of the burden in Lyng as a matter of interference 
“with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment.” Standing Rock II, 239 F. Supp. 
3d at 92 (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988)). 
 296. Id. at 93; see also Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting RFRA claim for a federal prisoner objecting to government’s extracting of DNA 
tissue samples). 
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judge found additional support for the analogy with Lyng in the 
fact that the land in question under Lake Oahe was flatly “federal 
land,”297 obscuring the treaty claims, court protected water rights, 
flooding of hundreds of thousands of acres of Lakota lands, and the 
implicated federal trust responsibility that other courts, in other 
contexts, had taken into account over and again.298 The Court cited 
multiple authorities for the applicability of Lyng to RFRA cases and 
held that Hobby Lobby and Holt, while extending RFRA’s religious 
freedom beyond the constraints of First Amendment law prior to 
Smith, did not do so in a manner that would advance Cheyenne 
River’s specific claims.299 Hobby Lobby, the court agreed, showed 
Congress intended in RFRA “to effect a complete separation from 
First Amendment case law” with regard to the definition of 
“exercise of religion,”300 but Hobby Lobby did not, the court held, 
change anything about the “substantial burden” analysis, and thus 
does not change the result because the Tribe “here faces no such 
coercion or sanction.”301 And where Holt had made clear that 
Congress in RLUIPA meant to lower the standard for a substantial 
burden under First Amendment analysis,302 the district court held 
this “does not impliedly overrule Lyng or otherwise undermine its 
relevance here.”303 
But as Cheyenne River had argued, there is a distinction to be 
made between its case and that decided in Navajo Nation, following 
Lyng. 304 In those cases, the spiritual fulfillment of individuals was 
the rendering of the burdened practice: “‘the only effect of the 
 
 297. Standing Rock II, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 98 (“As the pipeline runs through the land 
under the lake, rather than the lake’s waters, the Court first discusses ownership of the land 
and then turns to the Tribe’s interest in the water.”). 
 298. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Sioux Nation v. United States, 
448 U.S. 371 (1980); Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 299. RFRA’s legislative history references to Lyng in understanding that pre-Smith 
substantial burden standards should still apply in judicial interpretations of RFRA, and 
approving appeals by appellate courts to Lyng in RFRA and RLUIPA cases. Standing Rock II, 
239 F. Supp. 3d at 93 (citing S. Rep. No 103-111 at 8–9 (1993); 139 Cong. Rec. S14461 at S14470 
(Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Oct 27, 1993)). 
 300. Id. at 96 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 696 (2014)). 
 301. Id. at 96–98. 
 302. CRST Motion, supra note 292, at 35 (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015)). 
 303. Standing Rock II, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 98. 
 304. CRST Motion, supra note 292, at 35 (citing Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 
535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
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proposed [government action] is on the Plaintiffs’ subjective, 
emotional religious experience.’ In short the court held that the 
burden imposed upon the Indian’s religious practice was too 
weakly connected to the government regulation.”305 In Hobby Lobby, 
by contrast, the real question that RFRA presents is “‘whether the 
[government regulation] imposes a substantial burden on the 
ability of the plaintiff to [act] in accordance with their religious 
beliefs’, not ‘whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is 
reasonable.’”306 The illogic of a tidy distinction between subjective, 
emotional experience and substantially burdened free exercise, 
Cheyenne River argued, is borne out even more clearly in the 
prisoner cases:  
Unless one is an observant Jew, the burden of being forced to eat 
food that is not prepared in a kosher kitchen must seem subjective 
and emotional, rather than objective and rational. Yet the 
courts . . . did not apply a test of whether the belief was objective 
and rational to determine whether it substantially burdened 
prisoners forced to choose between eating non-kosher food or 
violating their religious beliefs. To apply such a test would be to 
question the validity of keeping kosher or observing halal 
practices, which the law does not permit.307 
The religious obligation standard signaled anew by Holt v. 
Hobbs could be a game-changer for how sacred lands claims, when 
there are—and there usually are—compelling accepted facts of 
religious obligation akin to those accepted in the Navajo Nation case, 
can pass the threshold of the substantial burden analysis. This 
would be particularly compelling in a case that should arise in a 
different circuit, perhaps especially within the Tenth Circuit, where 
Comanche Nation v. United States applies a more expansive view of 
substantial burden than in the Ninth Circuit’s Navajo Nation case.308 
But even within the Ninth Circuit or other circuits holding its 
view of substantial burden, the Supreme Court’s recognition in 
Hobby Lobby of the religious exercise of a for-profit corporation, 
 
 305. Id. (brackets in the original). 
 306. Id. at 35–36 (citing Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014)) (brackets in the original). 
 307. Id. at 36 (citations omitted). 
 308. Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D (W.D. Okla. 2008). 
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could propel a view toward sacred land claims, or other claims 
advanced by tribes, as matters of collective rights. 
D. Hobby Lobby and Collective Rights 
As “persons,” corporations as an entity are, strictly speaking, 
legal individuals, and collectives only in the abstract, that exercise 
religion. But ambiguities about corporations as legal individuals 
emerged in the Court’s reasoning. In dicta, the Hobby Lobby majority 
related its view of the ostensible collectivity involved:  
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human 
beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law 
specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including 
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a 
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether 
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the 
purpose is to protect the rights of these people. . . . [P]rotecting the 
free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, 
and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own 
and control these companies.”309  
The dissent, concerned about the “immoderate” view of RFRA 
as inclusive of for-profit corporations’ religious exercise, worried 
about an ambiguity in the collective nature of corporations as legal 
persons. The dissent argued that the Court had potentially run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause by privileging the owners’ beliefs 
over the wide range of religious beliefs of the collective that makes 
up a for-profit corporation (in contrast with religious communities 
that incorporated not for profit making but expressly for shared 
religious goals).310 
If the Supreme Court has found that such for-profit 
corporations as Hobby Lobby, which is comprised of more than 
13,000 people, are “persons” exercising religious freedom rights, it 
seems time for courts to conceive of the religious freedom claims of 
American Indian tribes and Alaskan Native and Native Hawaiian 
 
 309. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 at 706–07. 
 310. Id. at 745–46. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The exemption sought by Hobby Lobby 
and Conestoga would override significant interests of the corporations’ employees and 
covered dependents . . . . In sum, with respect to free exercise claims no less than free speech 
claims, ‘your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.’”) 
(quoting Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919)). 
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communities, accordingly—not as aggregations of so many 
indigenous individuals but as collective religious freedom rights of 
the collectivities. 
The analogy between for-profit corporations and sovereign 
tribal governments is hardly airtight, to say the obvious. There are 
distinctive traits of sovereignty to the over 550 federally recognized 
tribes with their various constitutions, or even to the more 
corporate models of the legal communities formed under the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,311 and even in certain 
contexts, to the legal entities— typically non-profit corporations 
—through which non-recognized tribes organize.312 But where they 
depart has little to do with the analogical point here. If the collective 
rights logic of the Supreme Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby can 
distinguish the protected religious exercise of the corporate 
expression of a collectivity of 13,000 diverse individuals, it can 
apply to legal expression of Native communities, even taking into 
account the internal diversity of their members. This is 
emphatically not to flatten all the arguments this Article has 
advanced in the preceding parts into a Hobby Lobby framework, but 
the Hobby Lobby moment does place in stark relief how doable it is 
for courts to recognize the collective rights of Native American 
religious freedom.313 
 
 311. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. ch. 33 (2012). 
 312. These can be, as in the case of the Lipan Apache Tribe of Texas, at the time of this 
writing, recognized by state governments but not by the federal government. McAllen Grace 
Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 313. Perhaps this is even more doable in light of the seating of Brett Kavanagh and 
especially Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. When a judge in the Tenth Circuit, Justice 
Gorsuch, joined the majority in the Hobby Lobby case, but further endorsed a view of RFRA’s 
expansive reach in a concurring opinion: “RFRA is indeed something of a ‘super-statute.’” 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d. 1114, 1157 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). By one count, Judge Gorsuch had heard nearly seventy claims involving federal 
Indian law of which he authored sixteen opinions. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Neil Gorsuch 
Indian Law Record as Tenth Circuit Judge, TURTLE TALK (Feb. 1, 2017, 12:17 PM), 
https://turtletalk.blog/2017/02/01/neil-gorsuch-indian-law-record-as-tenth-circuit-judge 
/. In one of those opinions he submitted to his Supreme Court confirmation process, a RFRA 
case involving prison sweat lodge access, Gorsuch showed a clear appreciation for the 
distinctive significance of Native American religions. See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 
(10th Cir. 2014). 
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CONCLUSION: THE COLLECTIVE RIGHTS  
OF NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
In this Article, I have argued that where Native American 
sacred claims have consistently faltered under judicial applications 
of religious freedom law, this has not been simply because, as many 
have argued, Native religions have distinctive contours that are 
hard to comprehend in the register of Judeo-Christian religions. 
They have faltered also because courts have consistently 
misrecognized claims to collective religious obligations and duties 
advanced by tribes themselves and flattened them into mere 
practices of an interiorized, subjective, and individual spiritual 
fulfillment—spiritual, not religious. And this judicial record has 
had the effect of discouraging Native communities from boldly 
bringing religious freedom claims to safeguard sacred places, 
practices, objects, and ancestral remains, turning instead to 
remedies under environmental law, cultural property law, and 
federal Indian law. But for all the intellectual and legal difficulties 
of fitting distinctive Native American traditions into the category 
of “religion,” religion and religious freedom remain power words 
in American culture and law, as we have seen in Hobby Lobby and 
other recent decisions. 
Courts and lawmakers, I have argued, can do better to ensure 
the religious freedom of Native Americans by reckoning more fully 
with the distinctively collective shape of so many Native sacred 
claims, especially when tribes are the litigants, wedding the robust 
protections for religious freedom, especially under RFRA as the 
Supreme Court interpreted it in Hobby Lobby, with the collectivist 
protections of federal Indian law. 
The long-established government-to-government relationship 
between the U.S. and federally recognized tribes distinguishes 
Native nations from other, merely religious, communities. Such an 
approach, I have argued, is neither altogether novel nor as perilous 
as recognizing collective rights elsewhere in religious freedom law. 
Statutes like NAGPRA and AIRFA, together with AIRFA’s Peyote 
Amendment, have grafted the substantive protection of religion 
into the structural logic of federal Indian law and have stood up in 
the courts because of the special political relationship with the 
recognized tribes. For their part, courts too have distinguished 
the distinctively collective shape of tribal religious interests from 
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those of individuals, as seen especially in the case law on 
accommodations under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection 
Act. Although such recognitions of the collective rights of Native 
American religious freedom have relied on the distinction of 
federal acknowledgement that excludes a significant number of 
Native American communities and their members from fuller 
religious freedom, this problem is not insurmountable; reasonable 
distinctions can be and have been made by courts to include 
members of at least some specific Native communities that lack 
federal recognition but that are recognized by states.314 
I have also argued that the current state of federal Indian law 
on these questions need not define the horizon of legal imagination 
here. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, although it is a non-binding instrument, makes explicit that 
religious freedom rights elsewhere enumerated in binding 
international human rights instruments must be regarded as 
collective and not just individual rights if they are to meaningfully 
apply to indigenous peoples.315  
So, what might a more systematic regard for the collective 
rights of Native American religious freedom look like? 
Courts considering Native American free exercise claims under 
the First Amendment can consider bundling religious free exercise 
rights with obligations to recognized tribes under federal Indian 
law. In its Employment Div. v. Smith holding, the Supreme Court 
distinguished Smith from precedents like Wisconsin v. Yoder and 
Sherbert v. Verner by saying the latter were never considerations of 
religious freedom rights alone, but those rights bundled with other 
rights, like free speech or parental rights.316 At the very least, as 
Kristen Carpenter suggests, courts could invoke the special 
relationship to the tribes.317 Similarly, as courts hear tribal claims 
 
 314. McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).. 
 315. Although the Canadian Supreme Court did not fully engage such an argument, 
the Ktunaxa First Nation’s challenge to a proposed ski resort on sacred lands in British 
Columbia raised the possibility of conceptually conjoining Canada’s recognition of collective 
aboriginal rights under Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act with the Canadian Charter’s 2(a) 
protections of religious freedom for all Canadians. See Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 386 (Can.). 
 316. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
 317. Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 27, at 417–18. 
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under RFRA, they should regard those claims not solely as religious 
freedom claims of individuals but of tribes, or of individuals as 
members of tribes, that implicate the United States’ government-
to-government relationship and trust responsibility to protect 
and preserve the religions and cultures of those tribes and 
their members.318 
And where it comes to sacred land claims by tribes that are so 
crucial to Native American religious freedom, courts should 
rethink just how controlling Navajo Nation and Lyng should be in 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby ruling that Congress 
intended RFRA to go well beyond the pre-Smith jurisprudence. As 
I argue above, the Native claims to sacred lands could very well 
have prevailed in Navajo Nation were the case adjudicated in the 
wake of Hobby Lobby. 
Congress can do more to enact narrowly-tailored legislative 
accommodations to promote fuller religious freedom for Native 
Americans, along the lines of the UNDRIP and more immediately 
along the lines of the Peyote Amendment of 1994 to AIRFA. Indeed 
AIRFA, which the Lyng court found to lack the legal teeth of a 
formal “cause of action” to bring suit, is one such congressional 
clarification that could draw on the persuasive power of religious 
freedom discourse as well as the clarification of the UNDRIP to 
level the playing field of competing claims, especially on federal 
lands, and to deliver on protection for Native sacred sites. In 2014, 
the National Congress of American Indians passed a resolution 
endorsing some suggested language for such an AIRFA cause of 
action related to sacred sites.319 After the November 2016 elections, 
one strains to imagine signed legislation in the short term; but 
perhaps as the idea builds, the statutory language can make even 
more explicit what AIRFA makes implicit—that Native American 
religious freedom not only requires considerations beyond the 
conventional understandings of religion in a majority Christian 
country to include such things as sacred sites but that Native 
 
 318. AIRFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996(1). 
 319. NCAI Res. ATL-14-032 (Ann. Sess. 2014) (The National Congress of American 
Indians titled the Resolution as “Calling for Protection of Native Peoples’ Sacred Places, 
Sacred Objects and Ancestors under United States, Native Nations and International Law, 
Policy and Practice.”), http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/calling-for-protection 
-of-native-peoples-sacred-places-sacred-objects-and-ancestors-under-united-states-native 
-nations-and-international-law-policy-and-practice. 
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American religious traditions may have far less to do with the 
spiritual fulfillment of Native American individuals meditating in 
pristine natural places, than with the collective obligations, and 
rights, of Native nations. 
 Federal administrations have considerable room to bring 
various agency policies to standards in keeping with the 
government-to-government relationship and federal trust 
responsibility and in aspiring to conform those policies to the 
provisions of UNDRIP. Although this Article has left unexplored 
this administrative terrain and what fuller accommodations for 
collective rights of Native American religious freedom would look 
like, it is clear that due diligence under current standards of 
government-to-government consultation and in the federal review 
obligations under environmental and historic preservation law 
(much less incorporation of UNDRIP’s standard of indigenous 
peoples’ free, prior, and informed consent on policies and 
developments that impact them) would go far to negotiate 
reasonable accommodations for Native communities’ sacred claims 
in advance of costly litigation or costlier controversy in courts of 
public opinion. As the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Energy 
Transfer Partners, and the state of North Dakota learned the hard 
way in terms of millions of dollars of lost revenue and lost clout, it 
can make good fiscal sense—not just moral and legal sense—to 
engage Native nations early and often to navigate impacts on what 
they hold sacred, collectively. 
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